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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of three essays that deal with variations in economic
growth and development across space and time. The essays in particular explore the
importance of differences in occupational structures in various settings.
The first chapter documents that intergenerational occupational persistence is sig-
nificantly higher in poor countries even after controlling for cross-country differences
in occupational structures. Based on this empirical fact, I posit that high occupa-
tional persistence in poor countries is symptomatic of underlying talent misallocation.
Constraints on education financing force sons to choose fathers’ occupations over the
occupations of their comparative advantage. A version of Roy (1951) model of occu-
pational choice is developed to quantify the impact of occupational misallocation on
aggregate productivity. I find that output per worker reduces to a third of the bench-
mark US economy for the country with the highest level of occupational persistence.
In the second chapter, I use occupational prestige as a proxy of social status to es-
timate intergenerational occupational mobility for 50 countries spanning the breadth
of world’s income distribution for both sons and daughters. I find that although rel-
ative mobility varies significantly across countries, the correlation between relative
mobility and GDP per capita is only mildly positive for sons and is close to zero for
daughters. I also consider two measures of absolute mobility: the propensity to move
across quartiles and the propensity to move relative to father’s occupational prestige.
Similar to relative mobility, the first measure of absolute mobility is uncorrelated with
GDP per capita. The second measure, however, is positively correlated with GDP per
capita with correlations being significantly higher for sons compared to daughters.
The third chapter analyses to what extent the growth in productivity witnessed
by India during 1983–2004 can be explained by a better allocation of workers across
occupations. I first document that the propensity to work in high-skilled occupations
i
relative to high-caste men increased manifold for high-caste women, low-caste men
and low-caste women during this period. Given that innate talent in these occupations
is likely to be independent across groups, the chapter argues that the occupational
distribution in the 1980s represented talent misallocation in which workers from many
groups faced significant barriers to practice an occupation of their comparative ad-
vantage. I find that these barriers can explain 15–21% of the observed growth in
output per worker during the period from 1983–2004.
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Chapter 1
INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY
1
1.1 Introduction
There are huge variations in labor productivities across countries. For example,
output per worker relative to US is a third in Asia, a fourth in Latin America and
an eighth in Africa (Duarte and Restuccia (2006)). A key finding of the development
accounting literature is that total factor productivity (TFP) differences across coun-
tries play a vital role in explaining these gaps in productivity relative to differences
in stocks of physical and human capital.1 A growing body of research is trying to
quantify the role of misallocation of resources in explaining the low levels of TFP
in poor countries.2 While most of this literature has investigated the misallocation
of capital, the goal of this paper is to study the effects of misallocation of talent in
explaining cross-country disparities in productivity.
Using multiple sources, I construct a unique dataset consisting of occupational
information on fathers and sons for more than 65 countries. The dataset is then used
for comparing cross-country differences in intergenerational occupational persistence.
I find that men in poor countries are more likely to be employed in their fathers’
occupations as compared to their counterparts in richer countries. For example, in
India one out of every two men is employed in the same occupation as his father as
compared to one in every seven men in the US. The situation is even more severe in
African economies where in some cases more than nine out of ten men pursue the
same occupation as their fathers. It is possible that the differences in unconditional
persistence stems from differences in occupational structures rather than conscious
occupational decisions. I account for this concern and show that intergenerational
occupational persistence is significantly higher in poor countries even after controlling
1For example, see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005).
2Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) provides a survey on this literature.
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for cross-country variations in occupational structures.3
The thesis of this paper is that the documented high persistence in poor countries
is indicative of talent misallocation in which sons follow their fathers’ occupations
instead of occupations of their comparative advantage. Given that education is es-
sential in transforming innate talent to marketable human capital, a potential factor
that influences occupational decisions is the availability of credit to finance educa-
tion. Weak credit markets in poor countries restrict such education borrowing and
a constrained worker gets trained by his father in the father-specific occupation. To
formalize the mechanism, I augment the canonical Roy (1951) model to account for
frictions specific to education spending.
I begin by assuming that each worker has a different endowment of innate talents
across possible occupations which determines his relative productivity across occu-
pations. Workers require occupation-specific education in order to translate talent
into marketable skills. Each worker is endowed with a home-based education technol-
ogy which enables him to get trained by his father in the father-specific occupation.
Alternatively, the workers can get educated by buying education goods and services
and financing this expenditure through borrowing. Imperfect enforceability of con-
tracts generate financial frictions which restrict workers from getting access to credit.
Credit constrained workers get trapped in paternal occupations leading to higher in-
tergenerational occupational persistence. Two channels present in the model generate
loss of labor productivity. First, a fraction of the constrained workers choose their
fathers’ occupations over the occupations of their comparative advantage. Second, a
fraction of constrained workers use the inefficient home-based education technology.
I adopt the specification used in Buera et al. (2011) and Buera et al. (2013) to model
differences in quality of credit markets.
3These facts have been documented in Section 3.2.
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To determine the quantitative importance of this mechanism, I calibrate the
benchmark model to match key features of the US economy which is assumed to
have perfect credit markets. This is in line with previous studies that have found
a limited role of credit constraints in explaining college enrollment decisions. The
counterfactual poor countries are constructed by making two changes to the bench-
mark: 1) replacing the US’s distribution of fathers across occupations with the poor
country-specific distribution of fathers and 2) choosing a level of financial frictions
to match the occupational persistence of the poor country.4 I find that output per
worker drops by a factor of three relative to the benchmark when the above features
are replicated for the country with highest persistence in the dataset. Decomposi-
tion exercise shows that 75% of this loss is explained by financial frictions. Workers
allocate to approximately efficient allocation starting from any paternal distribution
if the credit markets are perfect. The interaction of the two factors accounts for the
residual loss of 25%. An obvious concern of the previous exercise is that the resid-
ual measure of financial frictions leaves room for model misspecification. To test the
validity of the residual measures I directly measure frictions from one such potential
source, specifically the maximum limit on unsecured borrowing, for Tanzania and
India. I find that the residual measures are close to the estimated direct measures of
frictions in the two countries.
The benchmark model is stylized and makes two assumptions that seem restrictive.
First, the model requires all education spending to be financed via borrowing. I relax
this by allowing for paternal transfers which can be used for education expenditure.
The drop in output per worker is higher for the model with transfers in which workers
are able to offset the effects of frictions. This happens because larger frictions are
4There is some evidence that credit constraints are instrumental in understanding low human
capital observed in poor countries. For example, see Cartiglia (1997) and Ranjan (2001).
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necessary to target the same level of persistence in presence of transfers. Secondly,
the model assumes that workers receive no intergenerational transfer of talent from
fathers in the paternal occupation. I find that decline in output per worker in a
modified model with talent transfers is little changed from the decline observed in
the benchmark model. In the last robustness exercise, I allow the occupation-specific
fixed costs to differ across countries. Lower education intensity in poor countries imply
lower barriers to get sorted into occupation of comparative advantage. Opening the
misallocation channel via frictions is quantitatively important even after accounting
for the differences in education costs.
The chapter is related to three influential strands of literature. First, it relates
to the literature that seeks to understand the quantitative effects of resource allo-
cation across possible uses in understanding cross-country differences in incomes. A
number of studies within this literature have analyzed the effect of credit market im-
perfections on aggregate productivity.5 Similar to the method adopted by Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), Bello et al. (2011), and Hsieh and Klenow (2014), the estimates of
frictions in this paper are backed out as residuals. The paper is most closely related to
Hsieh et al. (2014) and Lagakos and Waugh (2013), who examine the macroeconomic
consequences of talent misallocation. Hsieh et al. (2014) find that improved talent
allocation can account for 15–20% of the US wage growth seen in the last 50 years.
Second, the chapter aligns with a large literature that has studied the role of credit
constraints in limiting investments in human capital. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo
(2011) reviews the US evidence on the importance of credit constraints. There is a
consensus that credit constraints played a limited role in explaining college attendance
5For example, Erosa (2001), Amaral and Quintin (2010), Buera et al. (2011) and Midrigan and
Xu (2014) analyze the importance of limited enforcement in explaining aggregate TFP losses from
misallocation of capital, entrepreneurial talent or both. Also, see Banerjee and Duflo (2005) for a
survey on microeconomic evidence.
5
decisions in the early 1980s (Keane and Wolpin (2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002),
Cameron and Taber (2004)). However, the findings of studies concentrating on recent
cohorts have been mixed (Belley and Lochner (2007), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2008), Johnson (2013)). Dearden et al. (2004) analyzes the UK data and report
that credit constraints were not binding for most of the population. The paper
builds on this evidence and extends the analysis to the developing world. Moreover,
as many poor countries are implementing programs that enable students to finance
education, it is important to understand the potential effects of such policies on
aggregate productivity.
Finally, this chapter ties to an extensive literature that has studied the relationship
between intergenerational occupational mobility and economic growth. In a much
earlier study, Lipset and Bendix (1959) find relatively little difference in mobility
rates among the nine industrialized countries. Kerckhoff et al. (1985) show that the
probability of moving from farming to white collar occupations was higher in the US
as compared to Britain. However, in a recent paper Long and Ferrie (2013) report
that while the US experienced higher mobility than Britain since the beginning of
the 20th century, most of this gap was erased by the 1950s. Behrman et al. (2001)
find that mobility is much lower in the Latin American countries when compared the
US. In the context of this literature, an empirical contribution of this paper is that
it provides mobility measures for a number of countries that are located across the
breadth of income distribution and establishes a strong negative relationship between
occupational persistence and income. Additionally, the paper proposes a mechanism
that can account for this negative relationship.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 provides the evidence of
negative relationship between intergenerational occupational persistence and incomes.
In section 3.3, I present the benchmark model of occupational choice in presence
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of financial frictions. Following, I calibrate the model and investigate the effects
of financial frictions on aggregate productivity in section 3.4. Finally, I show the
findings of robustness checks performed on the benchmark model in section 3.5 before
concluding.
1.2 Occupational persistence and income
In this section, I begin by discussing the data I use for computing occupational
persistence across countries followed by defining two measures of occupational persis-
tence. I then document that both measures of occupational persistence are negatively
correlated with income. Additionally, I show that the differences in persistences across
countries are sizeable.
1.2.1 Data
An ideal dataset for computing occupational persistence consists of a represen-
tative sample of workers with information on their occupations together with the
occupations of their fathers. The following four sources of data are able to provide
this required information. The first two sources provide paternal occupation when
the workers were between the ages of 14–22. This roughly corresponds to the prime-
age occupation of the fathers. The latter two sources record the occupation that the
fathers practiced for most of their lives.
1. European Social Survey (ESS): Data on 27 countries used in the analysis
are sourced from the ESS (ESS Round 2 (2004) – ESS Round 5 (2010)). Contrary
to the name of the survey, the ESS also covers some of the countries located in the
western region of Asia.
2. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79): I use
NLSY79 (Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012)) for the US as it contains occupational
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information of respondents and their parents.
3. Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS): The IHDS (Desai et al.
(2007)) is a nationally representative large sample survey of the households in India.
4. Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2012 (ELMPS12): The ELMPS12
(Economic Research Forum (2012)) consists of a representative sample of more than
8,300 households in Egypt.
Occupational persistence is measured for 30 countries using data from the above
four sources. The dataset contains some very rich countries (Norway, Switzerland, US)
together with some very poor ones (India, Ukraine, Turkey) and there is a considerable
variation in incomes across these countries. For example, per-capita-GDP in the US
is around 12 times per-capita GDP in India.
The next step is to harmonize the occupational data obtained from the four sources
into a common structure. As ESS contains the majority of the countries, the classi-
fication used by the ESS serves as a natural starting base. The occupations of the
workers in the ESS are reported using the 4-digit International Standard Classification
of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88). However, the 4-digit ISCO-88 coded parental occu-
pation data is available for only 9 countries. Parental occupation information for the
non-ISCO coded countries is available in the language the interview was conducted.
The nature of responses vary with respect to how narrowly they could be classified
on the 4-digit ISCO-88 taxonomy. I map these responses to the finest possible level
of detail. The resulting occupational taxonomy is very close to the standard 2-digit
ISCO-88 classification as shown in Appendix A. There are a total of 23 occupations in
this modified 2-digit ISCO-88 structure, which is four less than the standard 2-digit
structure.
For computing occupational persistence, I consider male workers who are at least
25 years of age. The age restriction is made for two reasons: first, most of the schooling
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is completed by the age of 25 and secondly, the occupational choices when younger
could relate to temporary jobs and not to the final choices of workers. The exclusion
of female workers stems from severe gaps in data relating to mothers’ occupations.
Appendix A contains a more detailed discussion on the construction of the dataset
and the occupational structure.
1.2.2 A Simple Measure of Occupational Persistence
I begin by defining a na¨ıve measure N k of occupational persistence for a country k
which simply measures the proportion of sons employed in their fathers’ occupations:
N k =
NK∑
i=1
I(jki , jkif )
Nk
, (1.1)
where jki and j
k
if denote the occupation of worker i in country k and the occupation of
his father respectively, and Nk corresponds to the total number of workers in country
k. The indicator function I(., .) equals 1 when the occupations of a worker and his
father are matched (jki = j
k
if ) and equals 0 otherwise.
The relationship between na¨ıve persistence and income is shown in figure 1.1.
There is a strong negative correlation between the two variables. Occupational per-
sistence varies over a large range across countries. India, the poorest country in the
sample has more than 45% of the workers being employed in their fathers’ occupa-
tions compared to 32-36% in Egypt and Turkey. Persistence drops further to only
about 15% observed for the US and the developed economies of western Europe.
1.2.3 An Adjusted Measure of Persistence
While simple and intuitive, an important drawback of the na¨ıve persistence is
that it fails to adjust for differences in occupational structure across countries. The
9
Figure 1.1: Naive Persistence Across Countries
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distribution of workers across occupations is more dispersed in some countries than
others.6 In India, two occupations account for 54% of the workers compared to 37% in
the US. Similarly, the two largest occupations employ as much as 75% of the fathers
in India compared to only 45% in the US.
Additionally, na¨ıve persistence is likely to be high for countries in which the work-
ers are concentrated in few occupations. For example, consider the occupational
structure of some of the African countries in which more than 80% of the popula-
tion engages in farming. Given such distribution, a random occupational choice by
workers will generate na¨ıve persistence in excess of 64% (0.8 × 0.8). Such high per-
sistence does not neccesarily indicate frictions in education or occupational choice.
In this light, it is vital that a measure employed to study cross-country variations in
persistence should account for such glaring differences in occupational structures.
In order to correct for differences in occupational structure across countries, I
6Appendix tables E.9 and E.10 report the distribution of workers and fathers across 1-digit
ISCO codes respectively.
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construct an adjusted measure of occupational persistence as described below. I
begin by estimating occupational persistence Rk that would be expected if sons made
occupational choices independent of their fathers’ occupations. Let pkj be the fraction
of workers employed in occupation j in any country k and pkjf be the fraction of
the workers’ fathers employed in the same occupation j. Assuming independence
of occupational decisions, pkj · pkjf gives the fraction of workers who are employed
in occupation j and are matched to their fathers’ occupations. Summing over all
occupations,Rk gives the expected occupational persistence if sons made occupational
choices independent of their fathers’ occupations,
Rk =
J∑
j=1
pkj · pkjf (1.2)
Consistent with the discussion before, I find that there exists a strong negative cor-
relation between Rk and income as shown in figure 1.2. The goal now is to find out
whether occupational persistence is higher in poorer countries even after account-
ing for this purely compositional effect. To do so, I define the adjusted measure of
occupational persistence Pk
Pk = N
k −Rk
1−Rk (1.3)
The adjusted persistence Pk measures how far a country is located between ran-
dom sorting (conceptually, a lower bound on the importance of occupational persis-
tence) and perfect sorting (1, an upper bound). In this way, the adjusted persistence
Pk accounts for the differences in occupational structures across countries.
Figure 1.3 describes the relationship between adjusted persistence Pk and incomes.
The correlation between persistence and income is strongly negative and significant
at 1%. The poorest country in the sample, India, has an adjusted persistence of over
30% as compared to around 6% observed in the US. This means that India is much
11
Figure 1.2: Random Persistence Across Countries
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closer to perfect sorting compared to the US even after accounting for the differences
in occupational structures across the two countries. The next two poorest countries,
Egypt and Ukraine, also have much higher adjusted persistence as compared to per-
sistences observed in many of the developed economies.
1.2.4 Census Data: IPUMS-I
A second approach to measure occupational persistences across countries is to
consider the household census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-
International (IPUMS-I, Minnesota Population Center (2014)). The father-son matches
can be identified using the survey data and occupational persistence can be measured
using occupational information of fathers and sons living within the same household.
The advantage of using this approach is that I can get persistence measures for a
much larger sample including some the poorest countries of the world like Malawi,
Guinea, Burkina Faso etc. Additionally, the sample size for a country increases by
12
Figure 1.3: Explained Persistence Across Countries
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many multiples compared to the representative sample when the census data is used.
On the other hand, an obvious limitation of such an approach is that the sample of
workers is no longer representative as it only contains sons who live with their fathers.
To determine whether the non-representative nature of census data is a serious
limitation, I compare the persistences measured from the representative and the non-
representative datasets for the 10 countries that are present in both datasets. Fig-
ure 1.4a plots adjusted persistence measured from the representative sample against
the non-representative sample. Adjusted persistence measured using the non-representative
sample is higher when compared to the representative sample for all countries except
Hungary. The regularity of upward bias hints that occupational choice of a son living
with his father is closer to his father as compared to a son not living in the same
household. The upward bias would pose a problem in determining the relationship
between persistence and incomes if the differences in measured persistences from the
two datasets were higher for poor countries, thereby inflating persistence for poor
13
Figure 1.4: Comparing Adjusted Persistence: Representative vs IPUMS-I
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Panel (a) plots the adjusted persistence measured from the IPUMS-I data against the persis-
tence obtained from representative data for the 10 overlapping countries. The persistence from
the IPUMS-I data lie above the 45-degree line for most countries indicating a positive bias in
persistence. Panel (b) plots this bias against incomes and shows the line of fit.
countries relative to richer ones.
Figure 1.4b shows the difference in persistence across the two datasets together
with incomes. The estimates differ by 3-7 percentage points for 6 of the 10 countries
including the US, while the maximum discrepancy of 12.5 percentage points is ob-
served for India. The magnitude of bias is negatively correlated with incomes but the
relationship is insignificant. Furthermore, this negative relationship is driven by In-
dia. Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Hungary, Turkey and Egypt are poorer than the
US and yet report lower discrepancy than that observed in the US.7 This suggests that
even though there is an upward bias in persistence measured using non-representative
data, the qualitative relationship between persistence and income is likely to be pre-
served in this dataset. The raw persistence obtained from the non-representative
dataset needs to be corrected for the upward bias. I do this by downward adjust-
ing the persistences using the mean of differences in estimates from the two datasets
7See figures E.1 and E.2 in appendix for na¨ıve persistence. The findings for na¨ıve persistence is
similar to that of explained persistence.
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Figure 1.5: Adjusted Persistence: IPUMS-I
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(6.1%).
I find that the negative relationship between persitence and income holds for
the extended dataset as shown in Figure 1.5. Tanzania and Mali are located half-
way between random sorting and perfect sorting. On the other hand, the adjusted
persistence in Burkina Faso relative to other African countries is low as compared
to its high na¨ıve persistence (96%). The adjusted persistence in Cambodia, India,
Vietnam and Sudan is more than 40% compared to Switzerland, Austria, US and
Hungary, all of which have adjusted persistence of less than 13%.
1.2.5 Role of Agriculture
Intergenerational occupational choices are generally more persistent in agriculture.
Even in US, 18% of the sons born to fathers in agriculture end up in agriculture. This
is 3 percentage points more than the national average. Intergenerational transfer of
land may be a reason why agriculture is associated with relatively high persistence.
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Given that poorer countries have higher share of employment in agriculture, it is
plausible that the higher observed persistence in poor countries is driven mainly by
higher persistence in agriculture. In order to assess whether agriculture is instrumen-
tal in determining the negative relationship between persistence and incomes, I drop
all observations in which paternal occupation pertains to agriculture. Persistence
measured hence does not include any agriculture-to-agriculture flow.
The correlation between explained persistence and income becomes even more
negative after dropping these observations. The horizontal and the vertical axes in
figure 1.6 show explained persistence calculated with and without agriculture respec-
tively. Interestingly, persistence for half of the countries is larger when agriculture is
excluded from the analysis. Barring Egypt, explained persistence in each of the poor-
est five countries without agriculture is higher than with agriculture. Explained per-
sistence with agriculture exceeds explained persistence without agriculture by more
than two percentage points for three countries, two of which are among the five rich-
est countries in the sample. Appendix B contains a detailed discussion on the role of
agriculture and similar robustness checks related to dropping of other occupations.
In this section I documented that there is a strong negative relationship between
intergenerational occupational persistence and income even after accounting for differ-
ences in occupational structures. Additionally, the relationship is robust to exclusion
of agriculture. Based on this documented negative relationship, I develop a general
equilibrium model of occupational choice in which financial frictions restrict compar-
ative advantage and lead to higher persistence.
1.3 Model
The model consists of two periods. The workers are born at the beginning of the
first period and develop skills required for work during the first period. The workers
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Figure 1.6: Adjusted Persistence with and without Agriculture
AUTBEL
BGR
HRV
CZE
GER
EST
FRA
GRC
HUN
IRL
IND
LTU
LVA
NLD
NOR
POL
PRT
ROM
RUS
SWE
SVN
SVK
CHE
TUR
UKR
GBR
USA
EGY
CYP
45−degree line
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ad
jus
ted
 P
ers
ist
en
ce
 w
/o 
Ag
ric
ult
ure
 (%
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
Adjusted Persistence (%)
supply labor for wages in the second period.
1.3.1 Technology
There is a representative firm in the economy which is endowed with a constant
returns to scale production function. The technology aggregates labor inputs from
various occupations to produce a composite good. The good produced by the firm
can be used for consumption or for repaying the credit taken from the financial
intermediary in the first period. The production function is given by
Y =
[ J∑
j=1
(AjHj)
ρ
] 1
ρ
(1.4)
where Hj is the labor input in occupation j and Aj is the occupation specific pro-
ductivity parameter. The elasticity of substitution across the J occupational labor
inputs is captured by the parameter ρ. The good produced by the firm serves as the
numeraire. The firm optimization problem is to choose J occupation-specific labor
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inputs {Hj}Jj=1 to maximize profits taking wages {wj}Jj=1 as given.
max
{Hj}Jj=1
[ J∑
j=1
(AjHj)
ρ
] 1
ρ
−
J∑
j=1
wjHj (1.5)
1.3.2 Workers
The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogenous workers of unit mass.
At the beginning of the first period, each worker receives an idiosyncratic talent
endowment  ≡ {j}Jj=1, with j being the talent of the worker in occupation j. In
the spirit of the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice, it is possible for a worker
to be endowed with high talent in a certain occupation but with a low talent in
another. The distribution of talent is independent across workers and occupations,
and follows the extreme value Fre´chet distribution. This specification is borrowed
from McFadden (1973) and has also been utilized by Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and
Hsieh et al. (2014) more recently. Specifically, each worker gets an iid draw of talent
endowment j for a given occupation j such that
Prob(j ≤ ) = e−−θ, j = 1, . . . , J (1.6)
The property that the maximum of N Fre´chet distribution is also Fre´chet distributed
eases the computation of the equilibrium. Apart from the talent, the occupation of a
worker’s father also differentiates him from workers with different paternal occupation.
A point to note here is that the talent that a worker receives relates to the comparative
advantage before any investments in human capital have taken place.
In order to supply labor to an occupation j, the worker requires a human capital
investment in the form of fixed education ξ¯j. Conditional on choosing occupation j,
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the human capital of a worker with talent  is given by
hb(, ξ¯j|j) = j ξ¯ηj (1.7)
where η is the elasticity of human capital with respect to education spending.
Apart from making human capital investments through borrowing in the credit
markets, the workers have access to another technology that can be used to create
human capital. Specifically, this technology allows the workers to get trained by their
fathers. However, the fathers can only train their sons in their own occupation. For
example, it is possible for a farmer to teach his son the use of agricultural tools and
a potter to teach pottery to his son, but it is not possible for the farmer to teach his
son pottery nor it is possible for the potter to teach his son the use of agricultural
tools. Conditional on choosing his father’s occupation f and using the home-based
education technology, a worker’s human capital is given by
hh(, ξ¯f |f) = f (αξ¯f )η (1.8)
where α denotes the efficiency of home-based education technology.
1.3.3 Credit Markets
The workers fund their investments in human capital through borrowing in the
credit markets. In the benchmark model, the workers have no access to household
resources that could be used to partially or fully fund their education. I relax this
assumption of necessary borrowing in a robustness exercise later to allow for paternal
transfers and show that the main results of the benchmark model are very similar
to the results of a modified model with transfers. The credit market is characterized
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by a perfectly competitive financial intermediary with a sufficient supply of credit to
satisfy the demand.
The presence of financial frictions in the credit markets put restrictions on workers’
ability to borrow from the financial intermediary. The modeling of financial frictions
follows the span of control specification of Buera et al. (2011) in which the level of
financial frictions in an economy is characterized by the parameter φ which can take
any value in the interval [0,1]. If a worker chooses to renege on the repayment of ξ¯j,
the financial intermediary can extract a fraction φ from his wage income. The worker
loses all of his wage income if he reneges in presence of perfect credit markets (φ = 1).
On the other extreme, in absence of any credit markets (φ = 0), the workers face no
penalty from reneging and end up with all of their wage income. The parameter φ,
thus, spans all possible levels of financial frictions.
1.3.4 Worker Optimization
The optimization problem of the workers consists of making the occupational
choice decision along with choosing the optimal education technology required to pro-
duce the human capital in the chosen occupation. Obviously, the worker can choose
the home-based education technology if he decides to practice the same occupation
as his father.
Optimization: Education through borrowing
In this section, I provide the neccesary condition for a worker to have access to credit
and show that the condition weakens as quality of credit markets improve. Suppose
that a worker chooses occupation j and accordingly borrows ξ¯j from the financial
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intermediary. Then the utility of worker with talent  is given by:
U˜Cj () = max
c,l
γlogc+ log(1− l)
subject to, c+ (1 + r)ξ¯j = wjh(, ξ¯j)l = wjj ξ¯
η
j l
(1.9)
The worker chooses consumption c and labor l so as to maximize utility subject to his
expenditure on consumption and repayment of ξ¯j is equal to his wage income, where
r is the rate of interest charged on the borrowing. The wage income received by the
worker is the product of occupation specific efficiency wage wj and the efficiency units
supplied by the worker h(, ξ¯j)l. Hence, U˜
C
j () represents the utility of a worker with
talent  conditional on choosing occupation j and making loan repayment.
However, the worker can renege on repayment of the loan in which case he foregoes
a fraction φ of his wage income. U˜Rj () denotes the utility of a worker with talent 
conditional on choosing occupation j and reneging on loan repayment:
U˜Rj () = max
c,l
γlogc+ log(1− l)
subject to, c = (1− φ)wjh(, ξ¯j)l = (1− φ)wjj ξ¯ηj l
(1.10)
The budget constraint when reneging allows the worker to escape the repayment of
after-interest loan (1+r)ξ¯j, but on the other hand he now receives only (1−φ) fraction
of his wage income which like before is a function of occupation specific efficiency wage
and efficiency labor units supplied.
The lending by the financial intermediary follows incentive compatibility. In other
words, the intermediary denies credit to any worker who has a higher utility from
reneging on the repayment of the loan, i.e., U˜Rj () > U˜
C
j () assuming that j is the
optimal occupation for the worker. It is assumed that the financial intermediary can
observe the talent of a worker with certainty.
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Hence, loans are granted to only those workers for whom it is optimal to follow
the repayment contract and as such, there are no defaults in the equilibrium. The
conditional optimization of the workers lead to the following two propositions.
Proposition 1: For a given level of φ, there exists a threshold level of talent
∗jφ for each occupation j, such that all workers with talent j < 
∗
jφ are denied loans
conditional on choosing occupation j.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 2: The threshold talent level ∗jφ is decreasing in the friction param-
eter φ, i.e., the measure of workers satisfying incentive compatibility decreases with
increases in financial frictions.
Proof: See appendix.
The first proposition identifies the lowest possible talent in any occupation j (for
a given level of φ) that a worker must have in order to borrow from the financial
intermediary. The threshold level of talent varies across occupations. The second
proposition states that more and more workers get credit constrained with increases
in financial frictions.
Optimization: Home-based education
In the previous section I identified conditions under which a worker has access to
credit. The only alternative available for constrained workers is to choose their fathers’
occupations. However, it may be optimal for workers to choose home-based education
even when they have access to credit. In this section, I discuss conditions under which
it is optimal for a worker to use home-based technology.
Instead of borrowing to obtain education, the workers can use the home-based
education technology to produce human capital. Additionally, the home-based tech-
nology is costless and hence, there is no borrowing required. The utility of a worker
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with talent  conditional on choosing his father’s occupation is given by Uˆ(, f)
Uˆ(, f) = max
c,l
γlogc+ log(1− l)
subject to, c = wfhh(, ξ¯f )l = wff (αξ¯f )
ηl
(1.11)
The home-based education technology is available to all workers and is not condi-
tional on a worker being credit constrained. Relatedly, it is possible for a worker
to choose home-based education technology because his returns from investment in
human capital through borrowing is not high enough to compensate the costs owing
to his low level of talent. This is summed up in proposition 3.
Proposition 3: There exists a talent level ∗f such that any worker with talent
f < 
∗
f optimally chooses home-based education technology conditional on choosing
his father’s occupation f .
Proof: See appendix.
Note that there are some workers who are credit constrained even when the credit
markets are perfect. However, the optimal decision for these workers is to obtain
education at home which makes borrowing constraints redundant. This result has
been formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary: When the credit markets are perfect (φ = 1), all workers for whom it is
optimal to borrow are able to borrow in the credit markets. In other words, incentive
compatibility holds for all such workers.
The occupational choice of a worker is a maximization over J + 1 conditional
utilities
U(, f) = max
{
max
j
{U˜Cj ().Ij()}Jj=1, Uˆ(, f)
}
where Ij() = 1 if incentive compatibility is met, U˜Cj () ≥ U˜Rj (), else Ij() =
−∞.
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1.3.5 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of the economy consists of optimal occupational choice
j∗(, f), conditional consumption choice {c∗(, f |j)}Jj=1, c∗h(, f), conditional labor
supply {l∗(, f |j)}Jj=1, l∗h(, f), total efficiency units of labor in each occupation
{H∗j }Jj=1 and efficiency wage rate in each occupation {w∗j}Jj=1 such that:
1. Conditional on an occupation choice j and taking wj as given, c
∗(, f |j) and
l∗(, f |j) are solutions to 1.9
2. Taking wf as given, c
∗
h(, f) and l
∗
h(, f) are solutions to 1.11
3. The optimal occupational choice j∗(, f) is given by
j∗(, f) =

arg max
j
{U˜Cj (, f).I(, f)} if max
j
{U˜Cj (, f).I(, f)} > Uˆ(, f)
f if max
j
{U˜Cj (, f).I(, f)} ≤ Uˆ(, f)
4. Taking efficiency wage rate in each occupation {w∗j}Jj=1 as given, the representative
firm’s optimal choice of efficiency units {H∗j }Jj=1 solves 3.3
5. The occupational wage rate wj clears the labor market in each occupation.
1.3.6 Mechanism
A simple two-occupation case can explain the channels through which productiv-
ity loss occurs in the presence of financial frictions. Figure 1.7 shows the optimal
allocation of talent across the occupations under perfect credit markets. The two
axes correspond to the talent of workers in the 2 occupations. For simplicity, assume
that all workers have the same paternal occupation and this occupation corresponds
to the one whose talent is measured on the horizontal axis.
Conditional on choosing his father’s occupation, it is optimal for a worker to choose
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Figure 1.7: Optimal Allocation Under Perfect Credit Markets
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Workers in the black region choose paternal occupation and obtain education via borrowing,
while workers in the white region choose the non-paternal occupation. The gray region represents
workers who choose to get trained by their fathers and the shaded region shows workers who
don’t have access to credit.
home-based education technology if his talent is less than the threshold level ∗f . The
black region shows the talent combinations for which the father’s occupation is the
occupation of comparative advantage, but the home-based education technology is
not optimal. The white region demarcates the talent combinations for which the
non-paternal occupation is the occupation of comparative advantage. The regions
(dotted and gray) to the bottom-left of these regions show the talent combinations
for which the father’s occupation together with home-based education is the optimal
choice. Note that while it is true a worker with talent less than ∗f would find home-
based education optimal conditional on choosing his father’s occupation, it is possible
that he may draw a higher talent draw in the other occupation making borrowing
and choosing non-paternal occupation optimal. These talent combinations lie in the
white region to the left of ∗f .
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There is a set of talent combinations for which incentive compatibility fails even
when the credit markets are perfect. The dotted region represents such talent com-
binations. ∗1 and 
∗
2 correspond to the threshold talent level 
∗
jφ in proposition 2
that a worker must have in any occupation to satisfy incentive compatibility. Hence,
any worker with talent less than ∗1 in father’s occupation or with talent less than
∗2 in non-paternal occupation is denied credit conditional on choosing the occupa-
tion. However, note that the dotted region of talent combinations for which incentive
compatibility fails is contained within the gray region of talent combinations and as
such the adoption of home-based education technology is optimal for these combina-
tions. While there are some workers who can’t get education financing even when the
markets are perfect, there are no inefficiencies in the system.
Figure 1.8a represents an economy with imperfect credit markets, albeit with low
level of financial frictions. In line with proposition 2, the threshold talent level ∗jφ a
worker must have to borrow in the credit markets increases with increase in financial
frictions (a decline in the φ). The threshold talent for paternal occupation increases
from ∗1 to 
∗
1L and from 
∗
2 to 
∗
2L. Consequently, the set of talent combinations for
which incentive compatibility fails (dotted and dark gray) become larger. Unlike an
economy with perfect credit markets, the allocation of talent is no longer efficient.
It would be optimal for talent combinations in the dark gray region to borrow and
choose the non-paternal occupation. The presence of frictions restricts the optimal
occupational choice for these talent combinations leading to an occupational misallo-
cation.
As financial frictions increase, the set of constrained talent combinations become
larger as shown in figure 1.8b. Now, a larger set of talent combinations are occupa-
tionally misallocated as compared to when the level of financial frictions were lower.
However, with sufficient rise in frictions, another source of inefficiency becomes opera-
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Figure 1.8: Allocation in Presence of Frictions
(a) Low level of frictions
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(b) High level of frictions
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Panel (a) shows occupational allocation at low levels of frictions. Workers located in the dark
gray region are forced to choose paternal occupation and are occupationally misallocated. Oc-
cupational allocation at high levels of frictions is shown in panel (b). Workers in the gray region
have comparative advantage in paternal occupation but use the inefficient home-based education
technology.
tional. The workers who have comparative advantage in their father’s occupation and
have talent in paternal occupation in excess of ∗f would want to borrow in the credit
markets instead of getting home-based education. Although these workers are not
occupationally misallocated, they use the inefficient education technology to produce
human capital.
In summary, productivity loss propogates in the model through two channels:
a fraction of credit constrained workers choose their fathers’ occupation over the
occupation of their comparative advantage and a fraction of credit constrained workers
use the inefficient human capital technology.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
The previous section outlined the mechanism through which inefficiency pro-
pogates in the presence of financial frictions. In this section, I quantitatively analyze
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the impact of allocation inefficiencies on labor productivity.
1.4.1 Calibration
I begin the quantitative exercise by calibrating the model to match key features
of the US economy which is assumed to have perfect credit markets, i.e. φUS = 1.
The calibration is performed jointly to estimate the 5+2J parameters of the model.
In the next step, I construct counterfactual countries by making two changes to the
benchmark: 1) replacing the US distribution of fathers across occupations with the
country-specific distribution of fathers and 2) choosing a level of financial frictions
to match the occupational persistence of the country. The quantitative effect of the
mechanism is then identified by the difference in output per worker between the two
economies.
Non-Occupation specific parameters
The human capital function parameter η represents the elasticity of human capital
with respect to education spending. There are estimates available for this parameter
from related literature focussing on human capital process. In line with estimates
reported in Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2014), η is assigned a
value of 0.400. The shape parameter θ on the Fre´chet talent distribution directly
relates to variance in wage income of the workers. As such, θ is calibrated in order
to match variance of wage income to that observed in the US data.
The utility parameter γ is the geometric weight on consumption relative to leisure.
When γ is lower, workers value leisure more as compared to consumption leading to
a decrease in labor supplied. Accordingly, the value of γ is pinned down by matching
the average time allocated to labor.
A son can choose to get educated by his father in the paternal occupation using the
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home-based technology. The parameter α captures the efficiency of this technology.
Conditional on choosing his father’s occupation, it is always optimal for a worker to
use the home-based technology irrespective of his talent in his father’s occupation
if α is at least as large as 1. An increase in α leads to more sons choosing their
fathers’ occupations. Any decrease in earnings resulting from low talent in father’s
occupation if offset by saved expenditure on education goods and services. Hence,
α is chosen to pin down the na¨ıve persistence observed in the US. Note that this
calibration technique does not ex-ante restricts α to be less than 1.
The only non-occupation specific parameter left to be estimated is ρ. The pa-
rameter chracterizes the elasticity of substitution across the occupation specific labor
inputs in aggregating the composite good. Due to a lack of guidance on the estimate
of ρ, I pick ρ = 2/3 in line with Hsieh et al. (2014). The benchmark is tested for
robustness by varying the chosen level of elasticity ρ.
Occupation-specific parameters
Productivity parameters {Aj}
The marginal product of labor in any occupation j depends on the occupation
specific productivity Aj. Likewise, the relative wage of an occupation j increases with
an increase in Aj, leading to more workers choosing it. Using this, these parameters
are pinned down in equilibrium by matching the distribution of workers across the J
occupations. A robust feature of these estimates is that the distribution of workers
in the model remains very close to the actual distribution of workers even when the
distribution of fathers across occupation is altered.
Education parameters {ξ¯j}
The only parameters left to be calibrated are the J occupation-specific fixed cost
ξ¯j. These fixed costs are lifetime expenditure on all education related goods and
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services, incurred on average by a worker in any given occupation. I use the variation
in schooling intensity across occupations to pin down these parameters. To implement
this, I assume the occupation-specific cost ξ¯j to be a function of average years of
schooling observed in the occupation j. Moreover, the cost of an addition year of
schooling at college level is allowed to be different from the cost of an additional year
of schooling at pre-college level.
I begin by decomposing the fixed cost of education in any occupation ξ¯j into
expenses incurred during pre-tertiary and tertiary schooling years. Specifically, the
fixed education cost in any occupation is given by
ξ¯j = ξ¯Pj + ξ¯Tj (1.12)
where ξ¯Pj and ξ¯Tj represents pre-tertiary and tertiary cost respectively. I then assume
that each year of pre-tertiary and tertiary education in any occupation costs ξ¯P and
ξ¯T respectively. Then, the fixed education cost for any occupation ξ¯j is given by
ξ¯j = ξ¯P
sPj∫
0
e−Rtdt+ ξ¯T
sTj∫
sPj
e−Rtdt (1.13)
where sPj and sTj are the pre-tertiary and tertiary schooling years required for an
occupation j and R is the yearly rate of interest charged on education loans charged
by the financial intermediary.
I assume that the first 12 years of schooling belong to the pre-tertiary education
and the remaining years correspond to tertiary education. It follows that the max-
imum number of years of pre-tertiary schooling that an occupation can have is 12
and tertiary schooling does not apply for occupations having less than 12 years of
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schooling.8 I use mean years of schooling in any occupation as a measure of total
number of years schooling required. Hence, the task of estimating J occupation spe-
cific education parameters is reduced to estimating two parameters: ξ¯P and ξ¯T . These
parameters are pinned down by matching pre-tertiary and tertiary spending-to-GDP
ratios of 4.7% and 2.6% respectively (LaRock (2012)). Table 1.1 summarizes the
calibration exercise.
Table 1.1: Calibration: Estimate and Target/Source
Parameter(s) Value Target/Source
Parameters from related literature
η: Elasticity of human capital∗ 0.40 Erosa et al. (2010)
Manuelli and Seshadri (2014)
ρ: Elasticity of substitution in production∗ 2/3 Hsieh et al. (2014)
Jointly Calibrated Parameters
θ: Talent variance 3.25 Variance of earnings
γ: Weight on consumption 0.47 Hours worked
α: Efficiency of home-based education 0.61 Adjusted persistence
ξ¯P : Cost of a year of pre-tertiary schooling 0.003 Pre-tertiary Spending-to-GDP
ξ¯T : Cost of a year of tertiary schooling 0.023 Tertiary Spending-to-GDP
Occupation Specific Parameters
{Aj}: Occupation-specific productivity - Distribution of workers across
occupations
Benchmark economy calibrated to match moments in the US data using the US as a proxy for
an economy with no financial frictions. The parameters in blue are taken from related literature
with sources listed. All other parameters are calibrated jointly.
∗Robustness checks performed.
8Agriculture (2-digit ISCO 61) is the only occupation having no years of tertiary education.
Please see appendix for mean years of schooling by occupation.
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1.4.2 Baseline Results
The objective is to quantitatively measure the effect of model’s mechanism on
labor productivity. The calibrated model represents the US economy which is assumed
to have perfect credit markets. In order to obtain productivity measures of other
countries, I make two changes to the calibrated US economy : 1) replace the US’s
distribution of fathers across occupations with the country-specific distribution of
fathers and 2) pick a value of financial friction parameter φ that pin downs the
adjusted persistence for the country. Table 1.2 shows the result of the exercise for
Tanzania (country with the highest persistence in the non-representative dataset) and
India (country with the highest persistence in the representative dataset). Appendix
tables E.1 and E.2 list the results for all countries in the two datasets.
Table 1.2: Productivity Relative to US
φ Relative Y Relative Y/H
(1) (2) (3)
Tanzania 0.12 0.32 0.33
India 0.26 0.77 0.79
Columns 2 and 3 report the output and output per hour worked in a country
relative to US respectively, while column 1 reports the level of financial friction pa-
rameter φ for the given country. Both measures of productivity drop by about a factor
of three when I match the adjusted persistence observed in Tanzania together with
the country-specific distribution of fathers across occupations. Output and output
per hour worked declines by 23% and 21% respectively for India. Output per hour
worked declines somewhat less compared to output because workers supply less labor
due to an associated drop in returns to human capital. The levels of financial frictions
φ that target the adjusted persistences for the two countries are much lower than the
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frictionless US economy, but are still some distance away from the other extreme of
no credit markets.
Table 1.3: Decomposing the Productivity Gains
Relative Y
Distribution Frictions Baseline
(1) (2) (3)
Tanzania 0.99 0.48 0.32
India 1.00 0.81 0.77
Column 1 reports output per worker relative to US when the distribution of fathers is changed
to country-specific distribution keeping the credit markets perfect. Column 2 reports output per
worker relative to US when φ is changed to country-specific level using the US distribution.
The loss in aggregate productivity is driven by presence of financial frictions and
potentially also by the denser distribution of fathers in poor countries. To understand
the relative importance of these two factors, I perform a decomposition exercise to
deduce the relative importance of the two factors. Column 1 in table 1.3 reports
output relative to the benchmark US economy when I replace the US distribution of
fathers across occupations with the country-specific distribution. There is almost no
change in productivity for either country. This means that the initial distribution
of fathers has no effect on the efficient occupational matching as long as workers
have access to well functioning credit markets. Column 2 gives the relative output
when country-specific level of frictions is used keeping the occupational distribution
of fathers fixed to the US case, while column 3 reports relative output when both
changes are made together. The results show that bulk of the loss in productivity is
driven by the presence of financial frictions alone with frictions accounting for around
4/5th of the total drop. Unlike frictionless case, the paternal occupational distribution
also makes sizable contribution to the mechanism in presence of frictions and explains
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22% and 17% of productivity loss for Tanzania and India respectively. In the next
section, I discuss the sensitivity of the baseline results.
1.5 Sensitivity
In order to generate output loss, the model requires workers to be credit con-
strained while financing education expenditure and have comparative advantage out-
side paternal occupation. The benchmark model abstracts from certain features that
may weaken credit constraints or positively affects the returns from choosing pater-
nal occupation. First, the constraints are bound to be weaker in presence of paternal
transfers that could be used for education spending. Second, workers may receive
intergenerational transfer of talents from their fathers making the father-specific oc-
cupation more likely to be aligned as the occupation of comparative advantage. Lastly,
the costs of education may be lower in poor countries making it easier to escape fi-
nancial constraints. I check the sensitivity of the baseline results reported in table 1.2
by modifying the model to account for the aforementioned channels. Moreover, the
magnitude of misallocation depends critically on the value of the financial friction
parameter φ. The values of φ are backed out as residuals by matching the persistence
and this strategy leaves room for model misspecification. In the last robustness exer-
cise, I test the validity of the residual measures by directly measuring frictions from
the data.
The baseline results are also found to be robust to changes in elasticity parameters
η and ρ. Appendix D.3 discusses these findings in detail.
1.5.1 Paternal Transfers
A feature of the benchmark model is that any worker who chooses to develop hu-
man capital through education spending ξ¯j does so through borrowing. This seems a
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harsh restriction as household resources could be used to fund such spending. Specif-
ically, it is possible that sons born in rich households in poor country could use
household resources to alleviate the impact of credit constraints. To consider such
a setting, I allow for paternal transfers that can be used for education spending or
consumption. In period 1, together with talent endowment the workers also receive
paternal transfers bf (> 0) which depends on the father’s occupation f . Any excess of
transfers over education spending can be deposited with the financial intermediary.
The transfers also serves as collateral when borrowing from the financial intermediary.
The Inada conditions cease to hold in presence of transfers as workers with low
talent across occupations can choose not to work. In order to induce all talent draws
to work, I abstract from labor-leisure trade-off and assume that labor is supplied
inelastically.
Conditional on choosing occupation j and repaying (when bf < ξ¯j), the utility of
a worker with talent  and father’s occupation f is simply his consumption in period
2 and is given by
U˜Cj (, f) = wjj ξ¯
η
j + (1 + r)(bf − ξ¯j) (1.14)
Alternatively, the worker can renege on repayment when bf < ξ¯j, in which case he
looses a fraction φ of his wage income and all of paternal bequest bf . Thus, his utility
from reneging is given by
U˜Rj (, f) = (1− φ)wjj ξ¯ηj (1.15)
The utility of a worker with talent  conditional on choosing his father’s occupation
f and using home-based education is given by
Uˆ(, f) = wff (αξ¯f )
η + (1 + r)bf (1.16)
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Like before, the occupational choice of a worker is a maximization over J + 1 condi-
tional utilities
U(, f) = max
{
max
j
{U˜Cj (, f) · Ij(, f)}Jj=1, Uˆ(, f)
}
(1.17)
where Ij(, f) = 1 if incentive compatibility is met, i.e., U˜Cj (, f) ≥ U˜Rj (, f), else
Ij(, f) = −∞.
The model with bequests is recalibrated independent of the benchmark model.
The independent calibration is done using the same targets as outlined in table 1.1.
The calibration of transfer parameters {bj} is discussed below.
Calibration and results
The parameter bj captures the amount of resources that are available to a son with a
paternal occupation j. In absence of any direct measures of such transfers, I adapt the
following simplifying procedure. Let pij be the mean income of fathers in occupation
j. Then, the transfers left by a father in occupation j is assumed to be proportional
to the mean income pij. This accounts for richer fathers leaving larger transfers for
their sons. Hence, the occupation specific transfer bj could be written as
bj = pijB (1.18)
An increase in the scaling parameter B raises parental transfers for everyone, thereby
reducing the borrowing requirements. The parameter is calibrated to match the
percentage of students receiving education loans in the US. This calibration probably
overestimates B as some students may use other sources of debt like credit cards, to
cover for low borrowing requirements resulting from scholarships, part-time work etc.
36
The calibrated B implies that paternal transfers received by workers are on average
as large as 14% of their lifetime earnings. The robustness of results to the choice of
B is shown in the appendix.
Table 1.4: Productivity Relative to US: Baseline vs. Transfers
Baseline With Transfers
Same Frictions Higher Frictions
φ Relative Y φ Relative Y φ Relative Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tanzania 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.40 0.09 0.20
India 0.26 0.77 0.26 0.80 0.13 0.67
Column 4 in table 1.4 reports relative output when workers receive transfers and
frictions φ are unchanged. The drop in output is 8 and 3 percentage points less
for Tanzania and India respectively. Less workers are constrained at same level of
frictions as compared to the benchmark model resulting in lower persistence than
that observed in data. Hence, higher levels of frictions are required to match the
persistence. Column 6 reports relative output when adjusted persistence in matched
in presence of frictions. The extended model requires φ to be 0.09 and 0.13 compared
to 0.12 and 0.26 to match the persistences observed in Tanzania and India respectively.
The drop in output is 12 percentage points more for Tanzania and 10 percentage
points more for India in presence of paternal transfers. The output drops more in
presence of transfers because sons of poor fathers are more likely to be constrained
compared to sons of rich fathers. Moreover, the costs of being trapped in fathers
occupations is higher for sons of poor fathers who are poor partially due to the low
productivity of their occupations.
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The quantitative findings of the model with transfers are within close range to
those obtained in the benchmark model. As such, the assumption of unavoidable
borrowing though appearing restrictive, is rather an innocuous one.
1.5.2 Intergenerational Persistence of Talents
The benchmark model assumes that talent drawn in any occupation by a worker is
independent of his father’s occupation. Yet, it seems reasonable that the probability
of drawing higher talent in an occupation would be higher for a worker whose father
was employed in that occupation as compared to someone whose father practiced
an occupation other than that.9 In order to test the quantitative importance of
such intergenerational persistence in talents, I estimate the wage premium earned by
workers employed in their fathers’ occupations using the regression,
log(W ) = α +
∑
j
βjdj + µM + ε (1.19)
where W is the wage income, dj’s are the occupation dummies and M is the dummy
indicating a father-son occupation match. Table 1.5 reports the results of the re-
gression. The unconditional wage premium for matched workers in US is 3.4% and
the coefficient is not significant. The wage premium increases to 10.7% controlled
for occupations and does not change much when agricultural workers are dropped.
This suggests that matched workers in an occupation have higher human capital than
unmatched workers. Consequently, it could be argued that such differences in human
capital stem from intergenerational persistence in talent from fathers to sons. On
9For example, if fathers had chosen their occupations based on their comparative advantage, then
fathers who chose farming are more likely to be physically strong as compared to fathers who chose
clerical jobs because physical strength is likely to be an important contributor to productivity in
agriculture. Consequently, the stronger fathers in agriculture are more likely to have stronger sons
more suited to farming as compared to sons of fathers in other occupations.
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the other hand, on average matched workers earn 50% less than unmatched workers
in India. Even after controlling for occupations and ignoring agriculture, unmatched
workers earn 13–16% more than matched workers. Such reversal in gap hints that only
highly talented workers’ are able to leave their fathers’ occupations in poor countries.
Table 1.5: Wage Gap Between Matched and Unmatched Workers
without without
Occupation Agriculture
Dummies
(1) (2) (3)
United States
Wage Gap 0.034 0.107∗ 0.108∗
Std Error 0.061 0.060 ∗ 0.060 ∗
India
Wage Gap -0.503∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.131∗∗
Std Error 0.211 0.051 ∗ 0.047 ∗
∗∗Significant at 5%. ∗Significant at 10%.
To account for such talent transfer, I assume that a worker’s talent in his father’s
occupation is drawn from a distribution with a higher mean. This talent draw is still
independent of draws in other occupations and follows Fre´chet, albeit with a higher
mean
Prob(j ≤ ) = e−(−µ)−θ (1.20)
if occupation j is the same as the occupation of the worker’s father f .
Calibration and results
Like in the previous extention, the model with talent adjustment is recalibrated in-
dependent of the benchmark calibration, targeting the same moments outlined in
table 1.1. The only additional talent distribution parameter µ is calibrated to target
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a wage premium of 11%. Next, I compare compare the quantitative findings of this
extended model to the findings of the benchmark model.
Table 1.6: Productivity Relative to US: Baseline vs. Talent persistence
Baseline With Talent Persistence
φ Relative Y φ Relative Y
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tanzania 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.35
India 0.26 0.77 0.27 0.80
Table 1.6 compares the results of the extension with the results of the bench-
mark model. The productivity loss reported by the extended model is less than that
reported by the baseline model. The difference in output loss reported by the two
models varies in the range of 2–3 percentage points for the two countries. Returns to
following paternal occupation increase with higher expected talent in father’s occu-
pation and this leads to higher occupational persistence at the same level of frictions.
Hence, lower level of frictions are required in presence of talent persistence if the same
level of persistences are to be matched. The extended model requires φ to be 0.13
and 0.27 compared to 0.12 and 0.26 to match the persistences observed in Tanzania
and India respectively.
Another way to analyze the importance of talent persistence is to endow economies
with perfect credit markets and increase the talent parameter µ to match the level of
country-specific persistence.10 Performing this exercise for India, I find that matched
workers earn 17% more than unmatched workers after controlling for occupations.
This is in stark contrast to the negative wage gap of 16% reported in table 1.5.
Allowing for a worker’s expected talent in his father’s occupation to be higher than
10It is also improbable that the level of intergenerational talent transfers depends on persistence.
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his expected talent in any other occupation only mildly dampens the effect of the
mechanism on productivity.
1.5.3 Differences in Education Intensity
The baseline model specifies that occupation-specific education costs {ξ¯j} are
invariable across countries. This specification allows me to isolate the effect of fric-
tions independent of any loss in output due to low education intensity seen in poor
countries. However, lower education intensity implies that the constraints in getting
employed in the occupation of comparative advantage are also lower in poor coun-
tries. It is possible then that the output losses due to frictions may be lower after
accounting for these differences.
In this exercise I allow occupation-specific fixed costs to differ across countries.
Let the mean years of pre-tertiary and tertiary schooling in occupation j and country
k be skPj and s
k
Tj respectively, then the occupation-specific cost ξ¯
k
j is given by
ξ¯kj = ξ¯P
skPj∫
0
e−Rtdt+ ξ¯T
skTj∫
skPj
e−Rtdt (1.21)
The per-year schooling expenditure, ξ¯P and ξ¯T are fixed at the US level. I recalculate
the output loss after allowing the barriers to be lower in poor countries. Table 1.7
reports the results of the exercise.
Column 1 reports relative output when both education intensity and frictions are
allowed to differ across countries. As expected, the loss in output is much larger
compared to the baseline case. In order to separate the loss generated by differences
in education intensity, I estimate the relative output when only education intensity is
allowed to change. I find that differences in education intensity can cause output to
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drop by 30% in Tanzania and 25% in India. Opening the misallocation channel is still
quantitatively important as output contracts by another 50% and 19% for Tanzania
and India respectively in presence of frictions.
Table 1.7: Productivity Relative to US: Differences in School Intensity
Relative Y
Intensity Intensity Baseline
+ only
Frictions
(1) (2) (3)
Tanzania 0.20 0.70 0.32
India 0.56 0.75 0.77
Column 1 reports output per worker relative to US when education costs are lowered in presence
of frictions. Column 2 reports output per worker relative to US when costs are lowered keeping
the credit markets perfect.
1.5.4 Direct Measure of Frictions
The country-specific measure of frictions in the baseline results were estimated
as residuals while matching the occupational persistence. An obvious concern is
whether such values of financial frictions are close to what one would obtain if one
was to directly measure these frictions from the data. The challenge here is that
direct measures of these frictions are difficult to obtain from the data and to obtain
a measure that reasonably captures all potential distortions might not be possible.
Following, I estimate direct measures of frictions from one such potential source to
test for the validity of the residual measures. I find that the residual measures lie
close to the estimated direct measures for the two countries.
To directly estimate φ from the data, I make a slight adjustment to the benchmark
model. Specifically, I abstract from the labor-leisure choice and assume that labor
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is supplied inelastically.11 Under this specification φ maps as a limit on borrowing
against the future wage income. To see this, let consumption while repaying be given
by CC = Y −D and consumption under reneging be CR = (1−φ)Y , where Y is income
and D is education debt. Incentive compatibility requires, CC ≥ CR ⇒ D ≤ φY .
This implies that borrowing is bounded by a fraction φ of income Y . The estimation
strategy to pin down φ entails finding what fraction of lifetime earnings could be
borrowed via unsecured loan for a given country. Next, I outline the process of
estimating frictions directly for the two countries using this interpretation of φ.
Frictions in India
The present loan system follows the guidelines of Education Loan Scheme announced
by the government in the budget of 2000–01. A maximum of Rs. 400,0000 (∼$7,000)
can be granted collateral-free under the scheme. However, the scheme requires the
parents or guardian of the student to be treated as co-applicants and as such, the
loan is not only borne by the student. More importantly, this maximum grant is
multiples less than actual cost of attending college, and in many cases factors less
than the tuition fees. For example, the I-Tenable (2006) study on education loans
reported that more than 80% of students receiving education loans were enrolled in
professional degree courses. The maximum grant is highly insufficient to cover the
total costs of attending these programs. Not surprisingly, loan adoption is a rare
phenomenon and only 2–3% of the graduating students in any year use education
loans as a source of financing (Agarwal, 2006).12 The paper also reports that default
rates on education loans are very low at 1.1%. This finding is in line with my model
11The results of the benchmark model are preserved under inelastic labor supply as shown in
appendix table E.7.
12In comparison, Titus (2002) report that 28% of all undergraduate students received federal
Stafford loans or Supplemental Loans to Students in 1999–2000. The percentages were much higher
for 4-year programs (public: 38% and private, not-for-profit: 47%).
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which precludes defaults in light of incentive compatibility.
Given this loan structures, financial friction parameter φ is pinned down by es-
timating the collateral-free borrowing as a fraction of lifetime earnings. I assume
that loans are taken at age 20 and workers complete college at age 24 and work till
age 65. Then, using the age-earnings profile of workers, I estimate the present value
of lifetime earnings at age 20 when the loan is taken. I calculate the lifetime earn-
ings of Indian men using the data from IHDS. As returns to college education are
high, I restrict my attention to men who at some point in their life attended college
irrespective of completing the college program. I find that the estimated φ ranges
between 0.13–0.19 depending on the choice of discount rate (2–4%) and is lower than
the residual estimate of 0.26.
Frictions in Tanzania
The Higher Education Students’ Loans Board provides loans to students based on
a means testing system due to a severe shortage of funds. The system takes into
account numerous characteristics of loan applicants and chances of getting loans are
higher for students pursuing science-based programs. In my estimation exercise, I use
a maximum limit of Tzs 3.1 million (∼$1,850) which applies to students of medicine
related courses. This choice provides the most conservative estimate of frictions since
loan financing varies across programs with medicine getting the largest funding. In
contrast to the Indian system, the board favors the students from poor households
and requires no co-signers.13 I use data from Integrated Labour Force Survey 2006
(National Bureau of Statistics (2006)) to generate age-earnings profiles of Tanzanian
men. For Tanzania, I consider profiles of only those men who had completed at least
12 years of schooling. Similar to the previous case, the estimated φ for Tanzania is
13See Board (2009) and Board (2014) for details.
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lower than the residual measure and ranges from 0.03–0.05 depending on the discount
rate.
Table 1.8: Residual and Direct Measures of Frictions
Residual Direct
Discount Rate
2% 4%
(1) (2) (3)
Tanzania 0.12 0.03 0.05
India 0.26 0.13 0.19
The direct estimates of φ for the two countries are similar, though somewhat
lower than the residual values used in the baseline analysis. The external evidence
suggests that the residual measures of financial frictions are not arbitrarily large and
in absence of direct measures can be used to analyze the quantitative impact on
aggregate productivity. In summary, the results of the benchmark model are robust
to a number of alternative specifications.
1.6 Conclusion
The paper documents that intergenerational occupational persistence is signifi-
cantly higher in poor countries. One out of every two sons in India is employed in the
same occupation as his father. However, a simple measure of persistence is unable to
account for the differences in the occupational structures across countries. I develop
an adjusted measure that corrects this and find that poor countries exhibit higher
persitence even after controlling for differences in in occupational structures. The key
idea of the paper is that such high level of occupational persistence is symptomatic
of talent misallocation in which sons end up in their fathers’ occupations instead of
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pursuing an occupation in which they hold a comparitive advantage.
Financial frictions seems an important factor that can restrict efficient occupa-
tional allocation in poor countries. Education is both costly and essential in order
to transform innate talent to human capital and credit constraints hinder workers
from borrowing in order to pay for their education. The only alternative for these
credit constrained workers is to get trained by their fathers and follow their fathers’
occupations. In this spirit, a version of Roy (1951) model of occupational choice in
presence of financial frictions is developed. Two mechanisms present in the model
cause productivity loss in presence of frictions: 1) a fraction of constrained workers
choose their fathers’ occupations over the occupations of their comparative advan-
tage and 2) a fraction of constrained workers use the inefficient home-based education
technology.
The model is calibrated to match the key features of the US economy assuming
that the credit markets in US are perfect. Productivity drops by a factor of three
relative to the benchmark US economy for the country with the highest level of
occupational persistence. The baseline results are robust to a number of alternative
specifications.
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Chapter 2
CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN INTERGENERATIONAL
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY
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2.1 Introduction
Most people would argue that higher rates of intergenerational mobility is good
for a society in which family background does not play a pivotal role in determining
the success of a child. In this regard it is important to know how mobility differs
across countries. Do the richest and most developed economies of the world have
higher mobility when compared to their poorest and least developed counterparts?
For the most part, research on intergenerational mobility has considered cross-country
variations within the developed world. This is partly because there is a general paucity
of income or consumption data spanning generations from the developing economies.
To overcome this obstacle, I use occupational prestige as a proxy of social status to
estimate intergenerational occupational mobility measures for countries located across
the world’s income distribution. The main finding of the paper is that while mobility
measures vary significantly across countries, there is little evidence of any meaningful
relationship between intergenerational occupational mobility and GDP per capita.
The data used are sourced from multiple sources and and the resulting dataset
consists of 50 countries. The dataset contains the richest economies (Netherlands,
Switzerland, US) together with the poorest economies (Guinea, Mali, Uganda) of
the world. This results in a considerable variation in incomes across these sample
countries. For example, per-capita-GDP in the US is more than 40 times higher than
per-capita GDP in Mali.
The occupational structure that harmonizes occupational information across coun-
tries is derived from the 4-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations
1988 (ISCO-88) taxonomy. I begin by assigning each occupation of the harmonized
structure a prestige score using the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) rat-
ings. I normalize the prestige scores on a scale of 1–100 so that the occupation with
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highest score receives a score of 100 and the one with the lowest score receives a score
of 1.
There are two scales that can be used to normalize prestige scores: an Abso-
lute scale which is same across countries and, an Adjusted Scale which normalizes
scores based on country-specific occupations with highest and lowest score. Mobil-
ity measures that assess the outcomes of children of fathers with low occupational
prestige relative to children of fathers with high occupational prestige will report
lower mobility for countries that have higher occupational inequality is the Absolute
Scale is used. The Adjusted Scale helps in controlling for differences in occupational
inequality across countries and generations.
I consider both relative and absolute measures of occupational mobility. In line
with previous research (Solon, 1999), I obtain my relative measure of persistence
by estimating the elasticity of child’s occupational prestige to father’s occupational
prestige. I find that the occupational elasticity for both sons and daughters varies
significantly across countries irrespective of the scale used. For example when the
Adjusted Scale is used, occupational elasticity is more than 0.40 in five and six coun-
tries for sons and daughters respectively compared to an elasticity of 0.19 and 0.15
for sons and daughters observed in the US. However, I find that there exists no re-
lationship between elasticity and GDP per capita for daughters. For sons there is a
mild negative correlation between the two variables (-0.21) when the Absolute Scale is
used but the association is not significant. The association becomes significant when
the Adjusted Scale is used but the magnitude of correlation still remains below 0.30.
Another finding here is that mobility in the US is among the highest for both sons
and daughters when the Absolute Scale is used. Comparisons using estimates based
on the Adjusted Scale move some nations above the US in terms of exhibiting higher
mobility.
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The absolute measures of mobility evaluate the outcomes of children of fathers
with low occupational prestige in absolute terms. I consider two measures of absolute
mobility in this paper: the propensity to move across quartiles (Corak and Heisz
(1999), Hertz (2006)) and the propensity to move relative to father’s occupational
prestige. I find that the transitional probability of moving from the bottom to the
top quartile for sons across countries is uncorrelated with GDP per capita. The tran-
sitional probability decreases slightly with GDP per capita for daughters, but the
relationship is not significant. Taking into account differences in downward transi-
tional probability, I find that although children in poor countries don’t have a higher
probability of moving up from bottom quartile, they face a higher probability of the
adverse outcome of moving to the bottom from the top quartile. The findings using
the second measure of absolute mobility differs significantly from the other measures.
I find that not only the propensity to move up but also the propensity to move down
relative to father’s occupational prestige is positive correlated with GDP per capita.
The correlations are particularly higher for sons relative to daughters. I also find
that the correlation is not driven by possible narrow partitions of occupations in rich
countries as the average gain (loss) in occupational prestige is correlated with the
propensity to move up (down).
An important comment to be made here is that the prestige scores used in this
paper are based on respondents’ evaluations of occupation titles that were conducted
in 1989. This raises concern to the comparability of occupational prestige scores across
space and time. Though previous research has found little evidence of variability
across either dimension, the results of this paper must be read with such issues in
mind.
The paper is related to an extensive literature that has explored how intergen-
erational mobility varies across countries (Black and Devereux (2011)). Several
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studies have used occupations to measure intergenerational mobility (Ermisch and
Francesconi (2002), Carmichael (2000), Ferrie (2005)). While most of these deal with
mobility in developed nations, the focus of this paper is to get mobility estimates for
developing countries for which multi-generational data is usually not available. Hertz
et al. (2007) consider educational attainment of fathers and sons and find huge vari-
ations in the intergenerational persistence across countries. Similar to the findings of
this paper, the persistence in their paper is uncorrelated with GDP per capita. More
recently researchers have started using first names and surnames to find variations
in intergenerational mobility across space and time (Gu¨ell et al. (2007), Clark and
Cummins (2012), Olivetti and Paserman (2015)). In particular, examining surnames
Clark (2014) finds that mobility rates observed in Communist China were similar to
those seen in modern US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses the data
and the construction of occupational prestige scores. Following, I estimate mobility
for the set of 50 countries used in the analysis and document how intergenerational
occupational mobility varies across countries. Section 3.3 reports the findings on
relative mobility while section 3.4 relates to findings on absolute mobility. The last
section concludes the paper.
2.2 Data
The data used in this chapter is identical to the one used in the previous chapter.
The dataset contains occupational information of children and their fathers. The
occupational information across countries and generations is harmonized using the
4-digit ISCO-88 taxonomy. The harmonized occupational structure uses the finest
mapping possible to the ISCO-88 taxonomy. As a result, certain occupational map-
pings are done at a 2-digit or 1-digit level for some countries.
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Multiple sources have been used to construct this dataset. I briefly discuss these
sources below.
2.2.1 Sources
1. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79): The NLSY79 (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2012) is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of
US youth born between 1957–64. The survey contains the current occupation
of respondents together with principal occupation of fathers at the time of the
first interview. The respondents were between the ages of 14 and 22 at that
time.
2. European Social Survey (ESS): The ESS (ESS Round 2 (2004) – ESS Round
5 (2010)) covers countries located within Europe as well as some countries in
the western region of Asia. The respondents were asked to list the principal
occupation of their fathers when the respondents were 14 years of age.
3. Household Surveys from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series - International
(Minnesota Population Center, 2014): The household surveys have occupational
information of the respondents. The father-child matches can be identified in
the data and occupational mobility can be measured using occupational choices
of fathers and children living within the same household.1 Using these surveys
allow me to obtain mobility estimates for some of the poorest countries in the
world like Guinea, Mali, Uganda etc. The surveys report the current principal
occupation of children and their fathers.
1This means that the sample of workers used for measuring mobility is not representative. Only
those fathers and children are considered who are living in the same household.
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4. Other Sources: Two large sample household surveys – Egyptian Labor Market
Survey 2012 (Economic Research Forum, 2012) and Integrated Human Devel-
opment Survey (Desai et al., 2007), are used for Egypt and India respectively.
Both of these sources contain information on the principal lifetime occupation
of fathers.
The next step is to assign each occupation a prestige score using the scores pro-
vided by the NORC.
2.2.2 Occupational Prestige
The NORC provides prestige scores for all 503 occupation titles that comprise
the 1980 US Census classification of occupations. The prestige scores are based on
respondents’ evaluations of occupation titles conducted in 1989 (Nakao and Treas,
1989). In order to reduce the burden of rating all 503 occupations, the sample of 1500
respondents were randomly divided into 12 groups. Each respondent was then asked
to distribute 110 of the 503 occupation titles on a scale of 1 to 9 with 9 representing
the highest prestige level. The first 40 occupations formed core occupations that
were same across all groups while the next 70 occupations were unique to each group.
Table 2.1 reports the occupational prestige scores associated with the five highest and
the five lowest ranked occupations.
There are two comments to be made here with regards to using the NORC prestige
scores. First, the prestige associated with an occupation is not time invariant. It is
possible that over time some occupations may gain prestige while other occupations
lose it. Hodge et al. (1964) report that while small changes in occupational prestige
occurred during the 1947–63 period in the US with scientific occupations gaining in
prestige, the overall occupational structure was stable during the period. Second, it is
possible that the occupational prestige measured in a country is not a representation
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Table 2.1: Occupational Prestige Scores
Highest Ranked Score Lowest Ranked Score
Physicians 86.05 Food Preparation Occupations 16.78
Lawyers 74.77 News Vendors 19.38
Computer Systems Analysts 73.70 Vehicle Washers & Cleaners 19.38
Environmental Science Teachers 73.51 Ushers 20.03
Biological Science Teachers 73.51 Maids & Housemen 20.05
of prestige associated with occupations in other countries. However, Treiman (2013)
finds that occupational evaluations are fairly constant across countries with the mean
correlation of occupational ratings for a pair of countries being 0.79. Nonetheless, it
is still possible that evaluations changed from 1989 to present and that evaluations
in some countries considered here are different from the evaluations observed in the
US. The results of this paper must be read with these caveats in mind.
The occupations that are used in this paper are derived from the 4-digit ISCO-
88 structure as discussed before. In order to assign an occupation a prestige score,
I map each 4-digit occupation to one or more occupations in the 1980 US Census
structure. When an occupation is mapped to more than one Census occupation, I
assign the mean of Census occupations prestige score to that occupation.2 For the
1-digit, 2-digit and 3-digit aggregated occupations, I use the mean prestige score of
the occupations that constitute the aggregated occupation.
Once I have prestige scores for all occupations, I normalize them on a scale of
1–100 so that the highest ranked occupation receives a score of 100 and the lowest
ranked receives a score of 1. There are two scales that I use to normalize occupations.
2For example, the 4-digit ISCO-88 occupation 2147 (mining engineers, metallurgists and related
professionals) is mapped to Census occupations 45 (metallurgical and materials engineers, prestige
score 61) and 46 (mining engineers, prestige score 60). The mean prestige score the two Census
occupations (60.5) is assigned to ISCO-88 occupation 2147.
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First, the Absolute Scale: which uses the occupations with highest and lowest prestige
from all possible occupations across countries. Second, the Adjusted Scale which uses
the occupations with highest and lowest prestige from all possible occupations within
a country. Measures of mobility based on the Absolute Scale assume that an indi-
vidual’s occupational choice set includes all possible occupations whereas measures
based on the Adjusted Scale restrict an individual’s occupational choice to occupa-
tions present in his or her own country. Mobility measures that assess the outcomes of
children of fathers with low occupational prestige relative to children of fathers with
high occupational prestige will report lower mobility for countries that have higher
occupational inequality is the Absolute Scale is used. The Adjusted Scale helps in
controlling for differences in occupational inequality across countries and generations.
I consider different measures of mobility that can be classified into two categories
based on whether they illustrate differences in relative mobility or absolute mobility.
The measure of relative mobility seek to understand how different are the outcomes of
children of fathers with low occupational prestige relative to the outcomes of children
of high prestige fathers. On the other hand, measures of absolute mobility evaluate
the outcomes of children of fathers with low occupational prestige in absolute terms.
In the next two sections, I show how the different measures of relative and absolute
intergenerational mobility vary across countries.
2.3 Relative Mobility Across Countries
For the most part, previous literature analyzing differences in mobility across space
and time has considered differences in relative mobility using income and consumption
data across generations. The goal is to estimate the elasticity of child’s income or
consumption to parent’s income or consumption. Isomorphic to such definition, I
regress the log of child i’s occupational prestige score Si on the log of occupational
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prestige score Pi of i’s father to obtain the intergenerational occupational elasticity
ξ:
log(Si) = α + ξlog(Pi) + i (2.1)
The elasticity ξ measures the expected percentage increase in a child’s prestige given
a 1% increase in father’s prestige. As such, higher elasticity is related with lower
relative mobility in which a father’s occupation play a larger role in determining a
child’s outcome.
Figure 2.1: Intergenerational Occupational Elasticity Across Countries (Absolute
Scale)
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Figures 2.1a and 2.1b plots the intergenerational elasticity estimated using the
Absolute Scale against GDP per capita taken from Penn World Tables (Heston et al.,
2012) for sons and daughters respectively. I find that elasticity varies significantly
across countries. For example, elasticity for sons is as low as 0.19 in the US compared
to being more than 0.40 in as many as six countries. The variance in elasticity
extends for daughters also. The elasticity for daughters in the US is estimated to
be 0.15 compared to the highs of more than 0.40 in five countries. However, the
more striking result is that there seems to be no systematic relationship between
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mobility and income. Mobility and income exhibit a mild positive correlation for
sons but the relationship is not significant. For daughters, the correlation drops to
almost zero as evidenced by the near concurrence of the lines of linear fit and mean
elasticity. Another important observation is that mobility in the US is among the
highest for both sons and daughters. The only countries with higher mobility for sons
and daughters than the US are Turkey and Iran respectively.
Figure 2.2: Intergenerational Elasticity, Sons vs Daughters (Absolute Scale)
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Figure 2.2 shows a positive correlation between mobility of sons and daughters
across countries. However, there are huge differences in relative mobility of sons and
daughters for some countries. Mobility for sons is high relative to daughters in Poland
and Austria whereas Iran, Mali and Netherlands have much lower relative mobility for
sons compared to daughters. Of the eight developed countries, I find that elasticity
for sons is higher than daughters in four countries and around the same as daughter
in two of them.3
As explained before, the relative mobility measures estimated using the Absolute
Scale do not account for cross-country differences in occupational inequality. The
3Ja¨ntti et al. (2006) found intergenerational elasticity to be higher for sons in five of the six
developed economies considered by them.
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elasticity for a country with higher occupational inequality would be larger. To check
whether the findings above are robust to the choice of scale, I estimate elasticity using
the Adjusted Scale. Figures 2.3a and 2.3b report the result of the exercise.
Figure 2.3: Intergenerational Occupational Elasticity Across Countries (Adjusted
Scale)
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I find that correlation between mobility and income increases marginally for
daughters but is still very close to zero. In contrast, the strength of negative as-
sociation between persistence and income increases quite a bit for sons and is now
significant at 10% level. However, the magnitude of correlation still remains below
0.3 and as such the relationship between mobility and income can at best be regarded
as weak. The US loses a couple of places to other nations who display higher mobil-
ity under the Adjusted Scale but still has higher mobility than most countries. The
relationship between mobility of sons and daughters across countries is still positive
and close to that observed before.
In summary, I find that although relative mobility varies significantly across coun-
tries, the relationship between relative mobility and income can at best be described
as a weak one. Also, the US displays higher mobility for both sons and daughters
compared to most countries. Now, I begin my discussion on measures of absolute
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Figure 2.4: Intergenerational Elasticity, Sons vs Daughters (Adjusted Scale)
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mobility.
2.4 Absolute Mobility Across Countries
The absolute measures of mobility seek to understand how outcomes in absolute
terms vary across countries for children being born to fathers with low occupational
prestige. As pointed by Chetty et al. (2014), higher relative mobility can be a product
of worse outcomes for children of high prestige fathers rather than better outcomes
for children of low prestige fathers. On the other hand, fixing absolute mobility at all
levels together with higher absolute mobility at any given prestige level is a definite
sign of betterment.
I consider two measures of absolute mobility: propensity to move across quartiles
and propensity to move relative to father’s occupational prestige.
2.4.1 Propensity to Move Across Quartiles
The fathers are grouped into four bins according to their occupational prestige
rank with respect to all fathers within a country. Similarly, all sons and daughters are
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grouped in different bins based on their occupational standing relative to all sons and
daughters within the same country. Then I calculate the probability of a child from
a father located in the bottom quartile to the top quartile of his or her generation. I
also calculate the probabilities of moving from top quartile of father’s distribution to
bottom quartile of child’s distribution.
Figure 2.5: Propensity to Move from Bottom to Top Quartile
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Figures 2.5a and 2.5b show the relationship between transition probability of
moving from bottom to top and GDP per capita for sons and daughters respectively.
I find that transition probability of moving from bottom to top quartile for sons
is uncorrelated with income. For daughters, the probability decreases slightly with
income but the relationship is not significant.4
The relationship between downward transition probability and income is slightly
negative for sons but is insignificant as evidenced in figure 2.6a. The correlation for
daughters is even more negative compared to upward transitional probability and is
significant at 10% level (figure 2.6b). However, this significance is driven by high
transitional probability observed in Sudan. Based on this it can be concluded that
4The magnitude of negative correlation is driven by India. The correlation (in absolute terms)
drops to -0.08 when India is excluded.
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Figure 2.6: Propensity to Move from Top to Bottom Quartile
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while children in poor countries don’t have a higher probability of moving from bottom
to top quartile relative to children in rich countries, they face a higher probability of
the adverse outcome of moving to the bottom from the top quartile.
Unlike relative mobility, the transitional probabilities are not high in the US com-
pared to other countries. In fact, the US is located at near median of country distri-
bution for both sons and daughters when upward transitional mobility is considered.
The US also displays very little variance in transitional probability, both upward and
downward, of sons and daughters.
2.4.2 Propensity to Move Relative to Father’s Prestige
The last measure of absolute mobility that I consider is the fraction of children
whose occupational prestige exceeds that of their fathers. Figures 2.7a and 2.7b plots
this measure against GDP per capita. I find that propensity to move up relative to
father’s occupational prestige is strongly correlated with income for both sons and
daughters unlike all measures of mobility considered earlier. It is possible that such
association is driven by general macroeconomic conditions in which higher growth (or
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development) in rich countries lead to better outcomes for all children irrespective of
father’s profile. A test of this hypothesis is to look at the propensity of children to
move down relative to father’s occupational prestige.5
Figure 2.7: Propensity to Move Up Relative to Fathers
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Figure 2.8: Propensity to Move Down Relative to Fathers
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5The sum of upward and downward mobility relative to father’s occupational prestige does not
necessarily add up to 1. This is because there are children who end up being employed in the
same occupation as their fathers or in occupations that have the same occupational prestige. More
importantly, the fraction of such children vary significantly across countries.
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I find that not only the propensity to move up but also the propensity to move
down relative to father’s prestige is positively correlated with GDP per capita (fig-
ures 2.8a and 2.8b). While general improvements in economic and social conditions
can explain more children moving up relative to their father’s prestige in rich coun-
tries, it cannot explain the higher downward propensity observed in rich countries.
Hence, it appears that forces other than economic growth and development are im-
portant in driving higher propensity in rich countries.
Figure 2.9: Average Gain in Occupational Prestige (Adjusted Scale)
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Figure 2.10: Average Loss in Occupational Prestige (Adjusted Scale)
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While it is true that more children in rich countries end up higher (lower) relative
to their father’s occupational prestige, it is possible that higher absolute mobility is
driven by narrow partitions of occupations in rich countries and that the average gain
(loss) is actually insignificant. As seen in figures 2.9a and 2.9b, the average gains
in occupational prestige for both sons and daughters is positively correlated with
the propensity to move up relative to father’s prestige. On average, a 10 percentage
point increase in the propensity is associated with an increase of 1.6 prestige points
for sons and an increase of 1.9 prestige points for daughters when the Adjusted Scale
for measuring occupation prestige is used.6 The relationship between average loss and
the propensity to move down is a little less for sons compared to average gain and the
propensity to move up (figure 2.10a). In contrast, the correlation between average
loss and the propensity to move down for daughters is almost equal to correlation
between average gain and the propensity to move up (figure 2.10b).
2.5 Conclusion
A cross-country study of intergenerational mobility featuring developing countries
is restricted due to a general paucity of income or consumption data spanning gen-
erations from these countries. In this paper, I use occupational prestige as a proxy
of social status to estimate intergenerational occupational mobility measures for 50
countries located across the world’s income distribution.
In order to compare mobility across countries, I consider both the relative and the
absolute measures of mobility. I find that although relative mobility varies signifi-
cantly across countries, the correlation between relative mobility and GDP per capita
is only mildly positive for sons and is very close to zero for daughters. I also consider
6Appendix figures G.1a and G.1b show the relationship between average gain and propensity for
sons and daughters when the Absolute Scale is used. The correlation between the variables is higher
when the Absolute Scale is used.
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two measures of absolute mobility: propensity to move across quartiles and propen-
sity to move relative to father’s occupational prestige. Similar to relative mobility,
the first measure of absolute mobility is independent to the level of GDP per capita.
The second measure, on the other hand, is positively correlated with GDP per capita
with correlations being significantly higher for sons compared to daughters. It also
appears that high propensity to move up in rich countries cannot be explained by a
general improvement in economic and social conditions in these countries.
The prestige scores used in this paper are based on respondents’ evaluations of oc-
cupation titles that were conducted in 1989. This raises concern to the comparability
of occupational prestige scores across space and time. Though previous research has
found little evidence of variability across either dimension, the results of this paper
must be read with such issues in mind.
The main finding of the paper is that though mobility differs significantly across
countries differences in occupational mobility cannot be explained by differences in
income. In future work, I intend to isolate factors that can explain the huge variations
in mobility across countries.
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Chapter 3
ALLOCATION OF TALENT AND INDIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
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3.1 Introduction
GDP per capita in India more than doubled during the period 1983–2004. There
was a massive change in occupational distribution of women and low-caste men during
the same period. For example in 1983, a high-caste woman was 1/10 times as likely as
a high-caste man to work as an engineer while a low-caste man was 1/7 times as likely.
In 2004, the propensity for high-caste women and low-caste men to work in engineering
occupations relative to high-caste men increased to 1/6 and 1/2 respectively. The
relative propensity of low-caste women in engineering in 2004 was at a dismal 1/16,
but it was still an improvement considering that no low-caste woman in the sample
was an engineer in 1983. Women and low-caste men saw dramatic increase in their
relative propensity to work in many other high-skill occupations.1
Hsieh et al. (2014) argue that innate talent in most occupations is unlikely to
differ across gender-race groups. In this paper I extend their argument to India. The
analogous idea presented here is that the occupational distribution in 1980’s India
represented massive occupational talent misallocation in which women workers from
both caste groups as well as low-caste men faced barriers to practice an occupation
of their comparative advantage. The goal of this paper is to understand the effects of
changes in these barriers on aggregate productivity. I employ the Hsieh et al. (2014)
model of occupational choice to study talent misallocation in India.
The defining feature of the model is that workers have different levels of innate
talent across possible occupations and the endowed talent is critical in determining
the relative productivity of a worker in any occupation relative to other occupations.
1Other studies have also found convergence in outcomes of these groups relative to high-caste
men. For example, Hnatkovska et al. (2012) find a significant convergence in education, wages and
consumption levels of low-caste workers toward high-caste workers. They also find a convergence in
occupational distribution using three broad occupations: white collar, blue collar and agrarian. In
this paper, I consider a much finer classification of occupations.
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Three forces present in the model lead to differences in occupational outcomes across
groups. First, workers of certain groups face wage discrimination in the labor mar-
ket and earn a lower per unit efficiency wage compared to high-caste men. Banerjee
and Knight (1985) and Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) find evidence of such wage
discrimination against Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribe workers. Ito (2009) show
that workers from these groups faced higher transaction costs with regards to landing
regular employment positions which have significantly higher wages than the other
casual employment opportunities. Second, workers of certain groups face frictions
in human capital accumulation which increases their cost of investments relative to
high-caste men. A variety of reasons can give rise to such frictions: relatively lower
investments in daughters’ education as compared to sons’ education, increased re-
source cost of attending schools for children from geographically segregated low-caste
households etc. For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) find that boys from
the lower caste households have a higher propensity of being enrolled in local lan-
guage school which limits their chances of being employed in white collar occupations.
Muralidharan and Prakash (2013) show that girls enrollment in secondary school in-
creased when they were provided with free bicycles conditional on enrolling. They
attribute this increase in enrollment to increased safety in attending school as well as
to changes in patriarchal social norms. Third, the model also allows for differences
in distribution of talent across groups. For example, the higher propensity of men
relative to women in brawny occupations may be driven by their natural comparative
advantage based on physical strength.2 Only the first two forces create distortions
in occupational choices and engenders talent misallocation. Taken together, these
three forces represent the gross frictions faced by the disadvantageous groups in any
occupation and in turn lead to differences in occupational distribution across groups.
2Pitt et al. (2012) study the role of nutrition on occupational choices of women and men.
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The distribution of talent follows the extreme value Fre´chet distribution with
different mean parameters across groups and occupations, but common variance pa-
rameter. An important implication of this specification is that the wage gap between
any two groups in any occupation is independent of any group-specific gross frictions.
Data on wage gaps and relative propensity across occupations finds evidence of no
systematic relationship between the two variables. Moreover, I also find that changes
in two variables over time are also uncorrelated with each other. The Fre´chet speci-
fication also allows for closed-form estimation of gross frictions given data on worker
wages and occupational choices. However, the decomposition of gross frictions to its
constituents is not possible before making further assumptions. The objective of the
paper is to estimate the role played by decreasing frictions in explaining the growth in
productivity during the period. To this end, I consider four different decomposition
of gross frictions.
I find that the model can explain 15–21% of the observed growth in output per
worker during the period from 1983–2004. My estimates of frictions show that even
in 2004 frictions faced by women from both groups were far from zero. Hence, I ask
how much would productivity increase if frictions are reduced to absolute zero in
all occupations. The potential increase in output per worker ranges from 10–14.5%
depending on the decomposition used. I conclude the quantitative section by showing
that the estimates of productivity gains are robust to a wide range of parameter values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses the data and
reports the extent of convergence in occupational distribution of various groups to
that of high-caste men over the period from 1983–2004. In section 3.3, I present the
occupational choice model in which frictions in labor market and human capital ac-
cumulation, and differences in distribution of talent drive differences in occupational
distribution between groups. Following, I estimate gross frictions from data in sec-
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tion 3.4 and show how they change over time for across different groups. Finally,
I quantify the effect of talent misallocation on aggregate productivity in section 3.5
and discuss the main results in detail before concluding.
3.2 Data and Occupational Similarity
I use the large sample employment survey data from 1983, 1993 and 2004 which
is obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-International (IPUMS-I,
Minnesota Population Center (2014)).3 With respect to caste groups, I divide the
population into two groups: Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) and non-
SC/ST. The caste groups are then crossed with gender groups. As such, the four
groups considered for analysis are: non-SC/ST men (high-caste men), non-SC/ST
women (high-caste women), SC/ST men (low-caste men) and SC/ST women (low-
caste women). High-caste men have the best economic outcomes relative to other
groups and hence serve as the benchmark against which outcomes of other groups are
measured. I restrict my attention to workers who are between the ages of 25 and 55.
The age restriction is made for two reasons: first, most of the schooling is completed
by the age of 25 and secondly, the occupational choices when younger (older) could
relate to temporary jobs and not necessarily to the final (principal) choices of workers.
The yearly surveys report the occupations using a single classification structure
which is comparable across years. This classification consists of more than 400 occupa-
tions. I use an aggregated version of this classification that contains 72 occupations.
For example, physicists, chemists, geologists, geophysicists and meteorologists are
grouped in a single occupation: physical scientists. The respondents who reported
working in the week previous to the survey were asked to list the main occupation in
which they worked in the prior week.
3The most recent data available is for the year 2004.
70
The propensity of a group to work in an occupation relative to high-caste men
can be calculated using the occupational distribution. Specifically, if pjg denotes the
proportion of workers in group g that are employed in occupation j, then the relative
propensity of group g to work in occupation j is given by
pjg
pj,hm
. Comparing relative
propensities across time presents interesting trends. In 1983, a high-caste woman was
1/10 times as likely than a high-caste man to work as an engineer while a low-caste
man was 1/7 times as likely. In 2004, the relative propensities for high-caste women
and low-caste men in engineering occupations reduced to 1/6 and 1/2 respectively.
The relative propensity of low-caste women in engineering in 2004 was a dismal 1/16,
but it was still an improvement considering that no woman from the sample group
was an engineer in 1983. The trends in other high-skilled occupations are similar to
that observed in engineering.
I use the measure of occupational similarity proposed in Hsieh et al. (2014) to see
whether there has been a convergence in occupational distribution of various groups
to that of high-caste men. The similarity index ψg for a group g is given by:
ψg = 1− 1
2
J∑
j=1
|pjg − pj,hm| (3.1)
The similarity index is equal to 1 when the relative propensity is 1 for all occu-
pations implying a perfect overlap, whereas a similarity index of 0 corresponds to no
overlap in occupational distribution. Figure 3.1 shows the trend in similarity index
for the different groups.
Occupational distribution of low-caste men was closer to high-caste men in 1983
compared to the other groups. Both low-caste groups witnessed occupational conver-
gence relative to high-caste men, though the gain for men was almost thrice as large
compared to women. Also, most of the gain in occupational convergence happened
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Figure 3.1: Similarity Index: 1983–2004
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The figure shows occupational similarity index for various groups in 1983, 1993 and 2004. A
higher index value indicates higher overlap with occupational distribution of high-caste men.
during the latter decade with similarity index of all groups changing little during
1983–1993. The similarity index for high-caste women declined slightly during the
entire period implying higher divergence in 2004. It is important to note that some
difference in occupational distribution between women and men is driven by the pos-
sible changes in comparative advantage of men over women in occupations requiring
physical strength. Moreover, the similarity index in 2004 for low-caste men is very
close to similarity index of black men relative to white men obtained by Hsieh et al.
(2014) in 2008. The analogy translates to white women and high-caste women as well
as black women and low-caste women.
In the next section, I discuss the model of occupational choice used to analyze
the effect of frictions on aggregate productivity.
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3.3 A Model of Occupational Sorting
3.3.1 Technology
There is a representative firm in the economy which is endowed with a constant
returns to scale production function. The technology aggregates labor inputs from
various occupations to produce a composite good which is either used for consumption
or for human capital creation. The production function is given by
Y =
[ J∑
j=1
(AjHj)
(σ−1)/σ
] σ
σ−1
(3.2)
where Hj is the labor input in occupation j and Aj is the occupation specific pro-
ductivity parameter. The elasticity of substitution across the J occupational labor
inputs is captured by the parameter σ. The composite good serves as the numeraire
and the firm optimization problem consists of choosing J occupation-specific labor
inputs {Hj}Jj=1 to maximize profits taking wages {wj}Jj=1 as given.
max
{Hj}Jj=1
[ J∑
j=1
(AjHj)
(σ−1)/σ
] σ
σ−1
−
J∑
j=1
wjHj (3.3)
3.3.2 Workers
The economy is populated with a unit continuum of workers and each worker is
a member of one of the four groups: high-caste men (hm), high-caste women (hw),
low-caste men (lm) or low-caste women (lw). The utility of a worker depends on
his/her consumption c and is given by the strictly monotonic function u(c).
Each worker is endowed with a unit of time. A fraction s of this time is spent
at school while the remaining fraction is supplied as labor to earn wage income. The
human capital accumulated by a worker is a function of the schooling time s and
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goods e, and is given by
hj(s, e) = s
φjeη (3.4)
where φj and η are elasticities of human capital with respect to schooling time and
education expenditure respectively. Schooling elasticities φj vary across occupations
and hence allow for schooling to have a larger impact on human capital accumulation
in certain occupations as compared to others.
3.3.3 Occupational Talent
A defining feature of the model is that workers have different levels of innate tal-
ent across all the possible occupations. This endowed talent is critical in determining
the relative productivity of a worker in any occupation with respect to other occu-
pations. The differences in talent across occupations capture the notion that workers
can be relatively better in certain occupations. For example, it is possible for some-
one to become a highly productive engineer but not a very productive hairdresser.
Specifically, each worker receives a talent endowment  ≡ {j}Jj=1, where j denotes
the level of innate talent in occupation j. Given schooling time s and education goods
e, the efficiency units supplied by a worker in an occupation j is given by
hj(s, e)j(1− s) = sφjeηj(1− s) (3.5)
The distribution of talent is assumed to be independent across occupations and
follows the extreme value Fre´chet distribution. The talent in an occupation j for any
worker in group g follows
Prob(jg ≤ ) = e−Tjg−θ (3.6)
where θ is the shape parameter that controls the variance of talent with a higher
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value denoting lower variance. The differences in T ′s allows for workers from certain
groups to be highly productive in an occupation as compared to workers from other
groups in general. It is possible that men are more productive in occupations where
physical strength is valuable compared to women. In such cases, differences in T ′s
leads to differences in relative weights of men and women in these occupations.
There are two types of frictions present in the model. The first friction occurs
in the labor market that leads to different wages being paid to workers from different
groups. Specifically, a worker from a group g receives an efficiency wage of (1−τwjg)wj
if choosing occupation j. The other friction is related to accumulation of human
capital in which workers from different groups pay different prices for the education
good e. A worker from group g spends (1 + τ ejg) for each unit of the education good
e. A variety of reasons can give rise to these frictions: relatively lower investments
in daughters’ education as compared to sons’ education, increased expenditure of
attending school for the geographically segregated low-caste households, caste and
gender based discrimination with respect to admission in schools and colleges etc.
Taking all the frictions into account, the budget constraint of a worker reduces to
consumption being equal to after-friction wage income less after-friction expenditure
on schooling
c = (1− τwjg)wjjsφjeη(1− s)− (1 + τ ejg)e (3.7)
In the next step, I set-up the worker’s optimization problem and present the findings
of the occupational choice problem.
3.3.4 Worker Optimization
The worker’s optimization problem consists of two steps: choosing an occu-
pation from the J possible occupations and choosing optimal schooling time s and
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expenditure in education goods e conditional on occupational choice. Conditional on
choosing an occupation j, the worker needs to solve
max
s,e
c ≡ max
s,e
(1− τwjg)wjjsφjeη(1− s)− (1 + τ ejg)e (3.8)
Solving the first order conditions of the above optimization problem yields the fol-
lowing expressions of optimal s and e:
s∗j =
φj
1 + φj
(3.9)
e∗jg(|j) =
(
ηwjjs
∗φj
j (1− s∗j)
1− τwjg
1 + τ ejg
) 1
1−η
(3.10)
Using the expressions of optimal education spending e∗jg and optimal schooling
time s∗j from above, and substituting them in the budget constraint gives the following
expression for consumption conditional on choosing any occupation j:
c∗jg(|j) =
[
wjφˆ
φj
j (1− φˆj)ηη(1− η)ηj
(1 + τ ejg)
η/(1− τwjg)
] 1
1−η
(3.11)
where φˆj = s
∗
j =
φj
1 + φj
. The occupational choice entails comparing these con-
ditional consumption across occupations and picking the one that generates the
largest c∗jg. The specification that talent follows Fre´chet distribution results in the
c∗jg() ≡ max
j
c
∗1/(1−η)
jg also being Fre´chet distributed. This result helps in isolating
a closed-form expression for the fraction of workers from a group g working in an
occupation j given by pjg.
4
4The choice of Fre´chet distribution is borrowed from McFadden (1973) which has been exploited
for its nice properties in other studies that have analyzed heterogeneity in talent across occupations
(Lagakos and Waugh (2013), Young (2014) etc.).
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Proposition 1: The fraction of workers in group g that work in occupation j is
given by
pjg =
w¯θjgTjg
J∑
s=1
w¯θsgTsg
where w¯jg =
wjφˆ
φj
j (1− φˆj)ηη(1− η)1−η
(1 + τ ejg)
η/(1− τwjg)
(3.12)
Proof: See appendix.
The above result helps in identifying what factors affect the flow of workers
into any occupation. An increase in efficiency wage wj leads to an increase in flows,
but in line with intuition there is no change in occupational decisions if wages in all
occupations rise proportionally. An increase in either of the two frictions leads to
flows out of that occupation. The flows are also increasing with an increase in mean
talent parameter Tjg. The mean talent parameter of a group can change over time due
to technological changes. An occupation that traditionally relies on physical strength
may become less reliant on it due to invention of new machinery, thereby increasing
Tj’s in favor of women. The following proposition establishes the relationship between
average wages earned by different groups across various occupations and serves as a
basis for evaluating the model.
Proposition 2: Let incjg denote the average wage income of a group g in an
occupation j. Then, the relative wages of any two groups is given by
incjg
incj,hm
=
[ ∑J
s=0 w¯
θ
sgTsg∑J
s=0 w¯
θ
s,hmTs,hm
] 1
θ(1−η)
(3.13)
and is same across all occupations.
Proof: See appendix.
An important implication of the above result is that wage gaps across occupa-
tions between groups are independent of frictions. The wage income of incumbent
workers increase with a decline in frictions. However, a decline in frictions also leads
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to new workers relocating from other occupations. The talent of entrants is lower
than the talent of incumbent group and this exactly offsets the upward pressure on
average income exerted by increased wage income of incumbent workers.
The propensity of a group to work in an occupation relative to any group is
obtained using equations 3.12 and 3.13 and is given by
pjg
pj,hm
=
Tjg
Tj,hm
(
τjg
τj,hm
)−θ(
incjg
incj,hg
)−θ(1−η)
(3.14)
where τjg =
(1 + τ ejg)
η
1− τwjg
. The relative propensity increases with an increase in relative
mean talent and relative mean wages while decreases with a increase in relative fric-
tions. I use the above equation, together with data on the relative propensities and
relative mean wages to estimate frictions later in the paper.
3.3.5 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for the economy consists of optimal occupational
choice j∗g (), conditional consumption {c∗jg(|j)}Jj=1, conditional schooling time {s∗j}Jj=1,
conditional education goods consumption {e∗jg(|j)}Jj=1, total efficiency units of labor
in each occupation {H∗j }Jj=1 and efficiency wage in each occupation {wj}Jj=1 such that
1. Conditional on choosing occupation j and taking wj as given, c
∗
jg(|j), s∗j and
e∗jg(|j) are solutions to the following optimization problem
max
c,e,s
c such that c = (1− τwjg)wjjsφjeη(1− s)− (1 + τ ejg)e (3.15)
2. The optimal occupational choice j∗g () is given by
j∗g () = arg max
j
{c∗jg(|j)}Jj=1 (3.16)
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3. Taking efficiency wage rate in each occupation {w∗j}Jj=1 as given, the represen-
tative firm’s optimal choice of efficiency units {H∗j }Jj=1 solves 3.3.
4. The occupational wage rate wj clears the labor market in each occupation.
3.3.6 Model Evaluation
Proposition 2 presents a strong result of the model. According to equation 3.13,
the wage gaps between two groups are same across all occupations. Any increase
in wage per efficiency unit due to declining frictions in an occupation is exactly
offset by entry of lower talent workers. The exact cancellation of the two forces
is an extreme characterization and is unlikely to hold true in reality. However, a
related implication is that wage gaps are not necessarily smaller in occupations in
which workers from disadvantageous groups have higher relative propensity to work.
Additionally, the convergence in wage gaps over time are also independent of changes
in relative propensity to work across occupations. These two claims can be tested
using data on average incomes and relative weights of groups across occupations.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plot the log wage gaps of high-caste women, low-caste men and
low-caste women relative to high-caste men together with their relative propensity to
work across occupations in 1983 and 2004 respectively. A high-caste woman was 9
times more likely to be employed in housekeeping services relative to a high-caste man
compared to being only 1/7 times as likely to be employed in wood and paper related
craft work in 1983. However, the wage gaps in these occupations was approximately
50% even with such huge variation in relative propensity. Similarly in 2004, high-caste
women in tailoring and dressmaking occupations as well as communication equipment
operation earned 50% less than high-caste men counterparts even though they were
7 times more like to be a tailor relative to men while only 1/13 times as likely to
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be a communication equipment operator. More generally, the correlation between
wage gaps and relative propensity across groups and years is never more than 0.15 in
magnitude and is always insignificant.5
Next, I check whether changes in wage gaps over time bear any systematic re-
lationship with changes in relative propensities. Figure 3.4 re-affirms the model’s
prediction that changes in relative propensities are independent of changes in wage
gaps in the sense that higher net flows doesn’t occur in and out of occupations that
witness larger convergence in wage gaps. For example, figure 3.4a shows that change
in wage gaps in wood and paper work, cooking, and carpentry for high-caste women
were similar even though there were huge variations in change in relative propensity
for these occupations. Similarly for low-caste men, propensity to become a physi-
cian or a surgeon more than doubled during the period compared to a three-factor
decline in propensity to become a launderer. Yet, the convergence in wage gap for
the two occupations varied in the narrow range of 25–40%. The correlation between
the change in wage gaps and change in relative propensity across different groups is
never more than 0.19 in magnitude and is always insignificant.
The above discussion lends support to the selection mechanism of the model in
which mean wage in an occupation is insulated to any flow of workers in or out of
that occupation. The next section discusses the estimation of friction parameters.
5The correlation magnitudes are higher in 1983 compared to 2004.
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3.4 Frictions
In this section, I use data on relative propensities and relative wage incomes to
estimate frictions and discuss how they have changed over time for various groups.
Rearranging the terms of equation 3.14, I get
τˆjg ≡
(
Tjg
Tj,hm
) 1
θ
τjg
τj,hm
=
(
pjg
pj,hm
)− 1
θ
(
incjg
incj,hm
)−(1−η)
(3.17)
where τˆjg denote the gross frictions that a group g faces in an occupation j that takes
into account differences in mean talent across groups for an occupation on top of
differences in frictions pertaining to labor market and human capital accumulation.
High-caste men (hm) serve as the base group relative to whom gross frictions in other
groups are estimated. The right-hand side of the above equation would be high if
either the relative propensity of a group is low compared to high-caste men or there
is a huge gap in mean income earned by that group relative to high-caste men (or
both).
The two parameter values that are required in order to estimate gross frictions
are those of Fre´chet shape parameter θ and elasticity of human capital with respect
to education goods η. The variance of wage income σ2inc and the mean income inc
within any occupation are related as follows:
σ2inc
inc
2 =
Γ
(
1− 2
θ(1−η)
)
(
Γ
(
1− 1
θ(1−η)
))2 − 1 (3.18)
I use the above equation to pin down the value of θ(1−η). First, I collect the resid-
uals from the regression of log of wage income on a set of occupation-group dummies
and education attainment. The occupation-group dummies control for occupation
84
related returns as well as any contribution of frictions. The mean and variance of the
residuals are then used to obtain the value of θ(1− η) by finding the solution to the
above equation. Using the three cross-sections, I obtain three estimates of θ(1 − η)
and use the highest among these (2.96) for my numerical exercises which translates
to being the most conservative estimate for the variation of innate talents.6 The esti-
mate of the elasticity of human capital with respect to education spending η is taken
from literature. In line with estimates used in Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and
Seshadri (2014), I assign η a value of 0.40. Using this value of η and the expression
θ(1− η) = 2.96, I back out the value of the Fre´chet shape parameter θ.
Figure 3.5 plots the gross frictions faced by low-caste men in a few selected
occupations.7 Gross frictions were just under 2 for low-caste men in engineering and
medical professions in 1983 and declined strongly over the next 20 years. The decline
was particularly impressive for low-caste doctor men for whom gross frictions stayed
just above unity in 2004. Frictions pertaining to social scientists and typists also
reduced significantly over the 20 year period. While the major drop in frictions for
engineers, doctors and social scientists happened during 1993 – 2004, typists saw
frictions dropping sharply in the earlier decade. I also find that gross frictions didn’t
decline for low-caste men across occupations as evidenced by increasing frictions in
mining. Low-caste male construction workers started with a frictionless state in 1983
and remained near frictionless over the next two decades.
Figures 3.6a and 3.6b plot frictions experienced by high-caste and low-caste
women respectively. Gross frictions for high-caste women declined from more than
3 in 1983 to just under 1.5 in 2004 in engineering occupations, a value lower than
that estimated for low-caste men. The frictions for low-caste women in engineering
6Please see appendix for the estimated gross frictions at θ(1 − η) being equal to 3.44, the value
used by Hsieh et al. (2014).
7Appendix table I.2 lists estimated frictions for all occupations.
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Figure 3.5: Estimated Gross Frictions: Low-caste men
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also declined from 1993 to 20048, but still remained above 2.5. Interestingly, frictions
in social science occupations for women in both caste groups were higher in 2004 as
compared to frictions in 1983. High-caste women in medicine and teaching enjoyed
gross frictions of less than 1 in 1983, but frictions increased gradually in both these
occupations for high-caste women and stood close to 1 by 2004. An important point
to note here is that high-caste women were almost thrice as likely to be in teaching
in 1983, but a lot of this advantage was offset by them earning 15% less than high-
caste men. In contrast, the frictions in medicine and teaching for low-caste women
decreased during the period but stayed well above 1 in 2004. Women blacksmiths
from both groups saw a drastic increase in frictions. The high gross frictions in
this occupation may be driven by the physical demands of the job instead of labor
market and human capital accumulation frictions. However, the much higher gross
frictions for low-caste women relative to high-caste women is less likely to be driven
by differences in mean talent. In the quantitative exercises performed in the next
section, I allow for talent differences across gender groups in brawny occupations but
8There were no women from low-caste engaged in engineering occupations in 1983.
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not across caste groups for the same gender. This implies that the talent distribution
of men in any occupation is independent of caste affiliations.
Figure 3.6: Estimated Gross Frictions
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(b) Low-caste women
In this section, I discussed how gross frictions can be estimated using the model.
The gross frictions can be higher for a group both due to differences in fundamental
endowment of talent as well as because of labor market and human capital accumu-
lation frictions. In the next section, I introduce four different interpretations of these
gross frictions and show what fraction of growth experienced by India from 1983 –
2004 is explained by changing frictions under each interpretation.
3.5 Productivity Gains
I begin this section with details on the calibration procedure. The calibration is
carried out separately for each year matching the key moments for each year. The
calibrated economies are then exploited to yield estimates of productivity gain.
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3.5.1 Calibration
The parameters of the model can be divided into two groups: ones that remain
invariant over time and ones that change over time. The three parameters that do
not change over time are η, θ and σ. The estimation of η and θ has been discussed
in detail in the previous section. The parameter σ characterizes the elasticity of
substitution across the J occupation-specific labor inputs. Due to a lack of guidance
on the estimate of σ, I pick σ = 3 in line with Hsieh et al. (2014). I also check the
sensitivity of results to this choice of σ.
The parameters that change over time are the friction parameters τwjg’s and τ
e
jg’s,
the mean talent parameters Tjg’s, the occupation-specific productivity parameters
Aj’s and the elasticities of human capital with respect to schooling time φj’s. I use
equation 3.9 in order to identify φj’s by calculating mean years of schooling in each
occupation. The productivity parameters are calibrated in equilibrium by matching
the distribution of workers across occupations to that observed in the data. An
increase in Aj for any occupation raises the returns to that occupation relative to
others and leads to flows of workers into the occupation. The only parameters left to
be calibrated are the ones that constitute the gross frictions τˆjg.
The first step in isolating these parameters is to assume that high-caste men do
not face any frictions, i.e., τwj,hm = τ
e
j,hm = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , J . Without loss of any
generality, the mean talent parameters of high-caste white men can be normalized
to 1 relative to which I can estimate mean talents for other groups. After these
adjustments, I consider the following four extreme cases:
1. There are no differences in mean talents across groups and no frictions in human
capital accumulation, i.e., Tjg = 1 and τ
e
jg = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , J and g =
{hm, hw, lm, lw}. Such specification leads to all gross frictions being attributed
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to labor market distortions. The next case is very similar to the present one in
which all distortions are restricted in accumulation of human capital.
2. There are no differences in mean talents across groups and no frictions in labor
markets, i.e., Tjg = 1 and τ
w
jg = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , J and g = {hm, hw, lm, lw}.
This leads to all gross frictions being attributed to distortions in human capital
accumulation.
3. High-caste women face neither labor market nor human capital accumulation
frictions in brawny occupations9 so that all gross frictions experienced by high-
caste women are explained by differences in mean talents. Also, the mean
talents in any occupation are same across gender groups. Moreover, the means
talents are same across all groups for all non-brawn occupations and all gross
frictions in these occupations are explained for by labor market distortions. In
summary, τwb,hw = τ
e
b,hw = 0 if b is a brawny occupation, Tn,g = 1 and Tj,lm = 1,
τ ej,g = 0 if n is a non-brawn occupation and Tj,hw = Tj,lw for all j = 1, . . . , J and
g = {hm, hw, lm, lw}.
4. All conditions of the above case remain except that in non-brawn occupations
all gross frictions are attributed to distortions in human capital accumulation
instead of distortions in labor market. In summary, τwb,hw = τ
e
b,hw = 0 if b is
a brawny occupation, Tn,g = 1 and Tj,lm = 1, τ
w
n,g = 0 if n is a non-brawn
occupation and Tj,hw = Tj,lw for all j = 1, . . . , J and g = {hm, hw, lm, lw}.
9See appendix table 3.1 for the list of brawny occupations. These relate to agricultural work,
craft work in building construction and metal, and others requiring strength-based unskilled labor.
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3.5.2 Results
Output per worker in India nearly doubled in 2004 from its 1983 level (Heston
et al., 2012). In the first exercise I explore how much of this productivity gain can be
explained by a better allocation of talent across occupations. I consider each of the
four specifications listed above and estimate Aj’s and φj’s separately for 1983 and 2004
under each specification by matching the relevant moments. The growth in output
per worker during this period is estimated using chaining. This entails estimating
growth by changing frictions from 1983 levels to 2004 levels when Aj’s and φj’s are
fixed at either 1983 or 2004 levels and then taking the geometric mean of the two
growth rates. Table 3.1 reports the result of the exercise for all four specifications.
Row 1 corresponds to specifications 1 and 2 while gains explained under specifications
3 and 4 are listed in row 2.
Table 3.1: Productivity Gains Explained Due to Frictions
Frictions in
Labor Market only Human Capital only
Frictions in all occupations 19.7 21.1
No frictions in brawny occupations 15.5 16.4
The table reports the fraction of growth in GDP per worker during 1983 – 2004 that is explained
by changing frictions over time. The brawny occupations are the ones corresponding to agricul-
tural work, craft work in building construction and metal, and others requiring strength-based
unskilled labor.
The model can explain 15 – 21% of the observed growth in output per worker
during the period from 1983–2004. Not surprisingly, the explained fraction declines
when frictions are assumed to be absent in brawny occupations. However, the drop
is not very large with specifications 3 and 4 still accounting for more than 3/4th of
gains explained by specifications 1 and 2 respectively. Frictions in human capital only
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are able to account for slightly larger growth in productivity as compared to the case
where there are frictions present in labor markets only.
Next, I isolate the growth in productivity that results from changing frictions
during the period. To do this, I estimate the growth in output per worker when
the productivity parameters Aj’s and human capital elasticities φj’s are allowed to
change but the frictions are kept fixed at 1983 levels. The gap in growth rate between
the baseline case and one obtained here can be attributed to changing frictions alone.
Table 3.2 reports the result of the exercise.
Table 3.2: Decomposing Growth in Output per Worker
Baseline Constant Frictions Gap
(1) (2) (3)
Frictions in Labor Market Only
Frictions in all occupations 18.5 9.4 9.1
No frictions in brawny occupations 14.6 7.6 7.0
Frictions in Human Capital Only
Frictions in all occupations 19.8 9.7 10.1
No frictions in brawny occupations 15.4 7.5 7.9
This table decomposes the growth in productivity to its potential sources. Column (1) reports
the growth in output when frictions are allowed to change in presence of changes in Aj ’s and
φj ’s. Column (2) reports growth when frictions are fixed at 1983 levels and column (3) reports
the difference in growth between the first two columns.
The main finding here is while changes in Aj’s and φj’s are important in un-
derstanding growth in output per worker, changes in frictions over time also have a
significant impact on productivity. In the case where all frictions apply in the la-
bor market, changes in frictions account for just under half of growth in output per
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worker. In contrast when all frictions are contained in human capital accumulation,
changes in frictions become the dominant source of productivity growth.
Lastly, I ask how much would productivity increase if frictions are reduced to
absolute zero in all occupations. To perform this counterfactual, the frictions are
exogenously set to zero keeping all other parameters at the 2004 level. Like before I
consider the four cases that determine the nature of gross frictions. Table 3.3 reports
the results of the exercise. Depending on the specification, the potential increase
in output per worker ranges from 10–14.5%. As seen before, estimated increase in
productivity is higher when frictions create distortions in human capital accumulation.
Table 3.3: Potential Increase in Output per Worker
Frictions in
Labor Market only Human Capital only
Frictions in all occupations 11.3 14.5
No frictions in brawny occupations 9.7 13.4
The table reports the counterfactual increase in output per worker from the 2004 level if frictions
across occupations are reduced to zero leaving all other parameters unchanged.
I conclude the quantitative discussion by examining the robustness of the results
to alternative values of η and σ.
3.5.3 Robustness
The value of the elasticity of human capital with respect to education spending η
is taken to be 0.400 based on Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2014).
Table 3.4 shows the sensitivity of results when alternative values of η are considered.
The model can account for slightly larger gains in productivity when a higher value
of η is considered and all frictions are attributed to the labor market distortions.
However, the model’s capacity to explain productivity gains do not change much and
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remains within 2% of the gains explained by the benchmark specification. The results
of the benchmark specification are more robust to changes in η when all frictions are
attributed to distortions in the human capital accumulation.
Table 3.4: Productivity Gains Explained Due to Frictions: Changing η
Baseline η = 1/100 η = 1/2
Frictions in (1) (2) (3)
Labor Market only 19.7 18.1 21.3
Human Capital only 21.1 20.3 21.0
The value of elasticity of substitution parameter ρ has been set to 3 following
Hsieh et al. (2014). Table 3.5 reports the sensitivity of results with respect to ρ. The
share of growth explained increases to 22.4% as occupations are made near perfect
substitutes (σ = 20) and decreases to 15.3% as occupations are made near imperfect
substitutes when all frictions are restricted in the labor market. Changes in explained
gains in productivity are less responsive to changes in value of σ when distortions are
restricted in human capital accumulation. A possible reason for this may be that
with an increase in σ, there is a general increase in human capital accumulation in
all occupations and this in turn makes misallocation more costly.
Table 3.5: Productivity Gains Explained Due to Frictions: Changing σ
Baseline σ = 0.1 σ = 20
Frictions in (1) (2) (3)
Labor Market only 19.7 15.3 22.4
Human Capital only 21.1 20.3 21.8
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3.6 Conclusion
Output per worker in India nearly doubled in 2004 from its 1983 level. During
the same period, there occurred a sea change in the occupational distribution of high-
caste women, low-caste men and low-caste women relative to high caste men. Workers
from these groups had a much higher propensity to work in high-skilled occupations
relative to high-caste men in 2004 compared to 1984. Given that innate talent in
these occupations is likely to be independent across groups, the paper argues that
the occupational distribution in the 1980s represented talent misallocation in which
workers from many groups faced significant barriers to practice an occupation of their
comparative advantage.
Three forces present in the model lead to differences in occupational outcomes
across groups. First, workers of certain groups face wage discrimination in the labor
market and earn a lower per unit efficiency wage compared to high-caste men. Second,
workers of certain groups face frictions in human capital accumulation which increases
their cost of investments relative to high-caste men. Third, the model also allows for
differences in distribution of talent across groups. I employ the Hsieh et al. (2014)
model of occupational choice to estimate what proportion of the massive productivity
growth that happened in India is attributable to changes in talent allocation across
occupations.
I calibrate the model to match the key moments observed in the data over time. I
find that the model can explain 15–21% of the observed growth in output per worker
during the period from 1983–2004. Additionally, my estimates of frictions show that
even in 2004 frictions faced by different groups were far from zero. I also find that
output per worker has a potential to increase by another 10–15% if frictions reduce
to absolute zero in all occupations.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1: CONSTRUCTION OF DATASET AND OCCUPATIONAL
STRUCTURE
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The data for the analysis is sourced from the sources listed below.
European Social Survey (ESS): The survey is conducted in 36 countries. The
survey contains data on a number of respondent’s characteristics like jobs, education,
beliefs etc. Critical to the analysis of the relationship between intergenerational
occupational mobility and economic development, the survey reports the occupations
of a respondent’s parents when the respondent was of 14 years of age. This parental
occupation data is available for 27 of the 36 countries in the ESS.
The 4-digit ISCO-88 parental occupation codes are available for 10 of the 27
countries containing information on parental occupations. Data for the remaining
18 countries are available in the form of text responses conveyed by the respondents.
The textual responses are often provided in the language the interview was conducted.
There are instances when the responses are in different languages for the same country.
For example, in Belgium the parental occupations are listed in Dutch, French and
German. The responses have been translated into English using Google Translate
and on few occasions using Babylon translation software.
The nature of these responses vary substantially in their level of detail and many
responses cannot be mapped to a 3 or 4-digit ISCO-88 level. However, most of the
responses could be mapped to a 2-digit ISCO-88 level. Still there are responses that
fail to make this cut. For instance, many responses note the parental occupation as
“clerk”. However, in order to map this response to a 2-digit level, I need to know
whether this refers to “Office Clerks” or “Customer service clerks”. Such responses
would be dropped if persistence is constructed using the standard 2-digit ISCO tax-
onomy. Table A.2 lists the 1-digit and 2-digit ISCO-881 occupations. The modified
2-digit classification is derived by making the following 3 alterations to the standard
2-digit taxonomy:
Table A.1: Countries in the European Social Survey
Code available Self Coded
Czech Republic Austria Portugal
Estonia Belgium Romania
Germany Bulgaria Slovakia
Greece Croatia Switzerland
Netherlands Cyprus Turkey
Norway France Ukraine
Poland Hungary United Kingdom
Russia Ireland
Slovenia Latvia
Sweden Lithuania
1. 2-digit ISCO code 12 and 13 are merged into one occupation level “12”
2. 2-digit ISCO codes 41 and 42 are merged into one occupation level “40”
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3. 2-digit ISCO codes 81, 82 and 83 are merged into one occupation level “80”
As a result, there are a total of 24 occupations present in the modified 2-digit ISCO
structure compared to a total of 28 occupations in the standard 2-digit ISCO struc-
ture.
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79): The NLSY79
is a longitudinal survey of youth that began in 1979 when the respondents were 14-22
years of age. At the inception, the occupations of the youth’s mother and father were
recorded. The occupational data of the respondents are available for the later waves
of the survey.
Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS): The IHDS is a nationally rep-
resentative survey of 41,554 households across India. The male head of households
were asked about their father’s principal occupation which helps compute occupa-
tional persistence for India.
Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2012 (ELMPS12): The ELMPS12 is
a nationally representative survey that contains information on education, occupation,
parental background etc. Respondents in the survey were asked about the principal
occupation of their parents. The occupational data for Egypt is reported on a much
detailed level and hence it is possible to map these occupations to the 4-digit ISCO
structure.
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International (IPUMS-I):
IPUMS-I project in engaged in costructing harmonized data across countries using
the publicly available census samples. There are around 60 countries for which the
IPUMS-I has occupational data coded on a ISCO-88 structure for at least an year in
the last 20 year period. Out of these 60, 3-digit coding is available for 29 countries.
The rest have occupations coded on a 1-digit level. Using the general 1-digit code
together with the original occupation coding from the census, the occupations are
mapped to the modified 2-digit structure for these countries. In some instances, the
original classification is not narrow enough to construct such mapping. There are
16 countries for which such a mapping has been done. Hence, I am able to measure
occupational persistence for 45 countries using the IPUMS-I data of which 10 also
feature in the baseline dataset.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 1: ROBUSTNESS OF ESTIMATED OCCUPATIONAL
PERSISTENCE
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B.1 Persistence Calculated From IPUMS-I Data
I used the mean bias in persistence for the 10 countries present in both
datasets to correct for the measured persistence obtained from the IPUMS-I data.
This adjustment was based on the fact that the bias was uncorrelated with incomes.
A concern here is that the bias might be correlated with incomes at very low levels of
income. I find that bias and income is uncorrelated even when the poorest countries
of the IPUMS-I database are considered.
Figure B.1: Persistence Across Datasets
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The red solid dots represent the adjusted persistence measured using representative sample of
workers while the blue hollow dots correspond to persistence measured using IPUMS-I data.
The similar slope of fitted lines across the two datasets imply that the bias from the IPUMS-I
data is uncorrelated with income.
Adjusted persistence estimated from both datasets are shown together in
figure B.1. The solid red dots correspond to persistence estimates from the represen-
tative dataset and the hollow blue dots show persistence calculated from the census
data. The dashed red line and solid blue line shows the linear fit between persistence
and incomes for the two datasets. The non-systematic bias in estimates from the two
datasets is captured by the similar slopes of the two regression lines. This means
that the upward bias present in the persistence calculated from the census data is
approximately constant across the income distribution. This is consistent with the
uncorrelated bias obtained across 10 countries shown earlier in the paper. Moreover,
the difference in intercepts (8.7%) of the two regression lines is fairly close the mean
bias (6.1%) obtained in the baseline adjustment.
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B.2 Persistence Across Occupations
Previously, I showed that the negative correlation between persistence and income
was not driven by agriculture. The correlation was negative and significant even
when persistence was calculated dropping the fathers practicing agriculture. However,
the concern here is that high persistence in poor countries could be due to larger
representation of workforce in implicitly more persistent occupations in general. To
test for this, I do the same exercise for all the other 22 occupations and find that
the correlation remains negative and significant at 1% level for all specifications.
Moreover, the magnitude of the relationship is in close range to what is obtained
with the complete data. Table B.1 shows the result of the exercise.
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 1: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
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Proposition 1: Let the optimal choice of labor supplied l by a worker with
talent j in occupation j, conditional on choosing that occupation be given by l
C
j ()
when making repayment and by lRj when reneging on the contract. From the first
order conditions of the conditional optimization:
lCj () =
γ
1 + γ
+
ξ¯j
1−η
(1 + γ)wj
(C.1)
lRj =
γ
1 + γ
(C.2)
Incentive compatibility for a worker with talent j fails if his utility from reneging
is greater than his utility from making the repayment:
U˜Cj () < U˜
R
j ()
⇒
[
γ
1 + γ
wjj ξ¯j
η
(
1− ξ¯j
1−η
wjj
)]γ[
1
1 + γ
(
1− ξ¯j
1−η
wjj
)]
<
[
γ
1 + γ
wjj ξ¯j
η
(1− φ)
]γ[
1
1 + γ
]
(using optimal conditions from C.1 and C.2)
⇒
(
1− ξ¯j
1−η
whj
)γ(
1− ξ¯j
1−η
wjj
)
< (1− φ)γ
⇒
(
1− ξ¯j
1−η
wjj
)1+γ
< (1− φ)γ
⇒j < ξ¯j
1−η
wj(1− h(φ, γ)) ≡ 
∗
φj
(
where h(φ, γ) = (1− φ) γ1+γ
)
.
Hence, a worker can obtain credit only is his talent in occupation j is at least as much
as the threshold talent ∗φj. 
Proposition 2: ∗φj(h(θ, γ)) =
ξ¯j
1−η
wj(1− h(φ, β)) ⇒
d∗φj
dφ
=
ξ¯j
1−η
wj(1− h(φ, β))2
dh
dφ
.
dh
dφ
< 0 ⇒ d
∗
φj
dφ
< 0. This means that credit becomes available to increasingly
lower talent levels as financial frictions are reduced. In the limiting case of no credit
markets, ∗φj →∞, which means no talent level is able to obtain funding for education.

Proposition 3: Conditional on choosing his father’s occupation f and obtaining
education using the home-based technology, the optimal time worked lH by a worker
is given by:
lH =
γ
1 + γ
(C.3)
It is optimal for a worker to choose home-based education technology instead of
obtaining it outside through borrowing if:
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U˜Cf () < Uˆ(, f)
⇒
[
γ
1 + γ
wff ξ¯
η
f
(
1− ξ¯
1−η
f
wff
)]γ[
1
1 + γ
(
1− ξ¯
1−η
f
wff
)]
<
[
γ
1 + γ
wff (αξ¯f )
η
]γ[
1
1 + γ
]
(using optimal condition from C.3)
⇒
(
1− ξ¯
1−η
f
wff
)1+γ
< αηγ
⇒f <
ξ¯1−ηf
wf (1− α
ηγ
1+γ )
Hence, there exists a ∗f such that conditional on choosing his father’s occupation
f , it is optimal for a worker with talent f < 
∗
f to use the home-based education
technology. Note if α ≥ 1 ⇒ ∗f < 0, this means that it is always better to use the
home-based technology as talent is always positive (f > 0). 
Corollary: First, consider the decision to choose the father’s occupation. At
φ = 1, h(1, γ) = 0. This implies that the threshold level of talent that a worker must
have in his father’s occupation to get credit is given by ∗f(φ=1) =
ξ¯1−ηf
wf
. If α ∈ [0, 1),
then the threshold talent below which it is optimal to use home-based technology
∗f =
ξ¯1−ηf
wf (1− α
ηγ
1+γ )
>
ξ¯1−ηf
wf
. Hence, conditional on joining father’s occupation, it is
always optimal for a worker to use home-based technology if he doesn’t has access to
credit. Of course, no workers at any level of φ are contrained if α ≥ 1.
For any other occupation j, consumption condition of choosing that occupation
is given by (using C.1)
c∗(, f |j) = wjj ξ¯jη
(
γ
1 + γ
+
ξ¯j
1−η
(1 + γ)wj
)
− ξ¯j
=
γξ¯ηj
1 + γ
(
wjj − ξ¯1−ηj
)
c∗(, f |j) > 0⇒ wjj−ξ¯1−ηj ⇒ j >
ξ¯1−ηj
wj
=
ξ¯1−ηj
wj(1− h(1, γ)) = 
∗
j(φ=1) (using h(1, γ) =
1). 
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D.1 Productivity Gap Explained
The baseline results in table 1.2 reported the loss in productivity for Tanzania and
India. The next natural question is what fraction of the total productivity gap can be
explained by the model. I compute this by comparing the model generated output per
worker to output per worker reported in Penn World Tables (Heston et al. (2012)).
Column 3 in table D.1 shows the model’s strength in explaining the productivity gaps
between the US and the two countries.
Table D.1: Productivity Gap Explained
Relative Y
Model Data Gap Explained
(1) (2) (3)
Tanzania 0.03 0.32 70%
India 0.11 0.77 26%
Column 1 shows output per worker relative to US as predicted by the model. Column 2 reports
output per worker relative to US (Source: Penn World Tables).
I find that the model is able to account for about 70% of the productivity gap
between Tanzania and US. The decomposition exercise implies that 54% of the gap
between the two countries can be explained by the presence of financial frictions alone.
The gap explained by the model for India is significantly less compared to Tanzania
but still sizable.
D.2 No Credit Markets
The counterfactual economies considered in the baseline results were some distance
away from an economy with no credit markets. Furthermore, the direct estimates of
frictions suggest that financial frictions could be higher in poor countries as com-
pared to the level of frictions used in the previous exercises. As such, I consider the
extreme case of no credit markets in this exercise. In this experiment too, I use the
country-specific distribution of fathers together with a single value of φ = 0 for all
distributions. Table D.1 reports the results of the exercise.
Column 1 reports output of an economy with a country-specific distribution of fa-
thers’ occupations with no credit markets relative to US under perfect credit markets.
Column 2 reports the analogous estimates for output per hour worked. Productivity
drops by a factor of 14–17 for Tanzania and by a factor of 7–8 for India. The exercise
also reports significant loss in productivity for US. The model predicts that labor
productivity would drop by about a factor of 3 in US if workers are unable to borrow
in order to fund their education. However, productivity for US in absence of credit
markets is still multiples greater than productivity for the other countries in absence
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Table D.1: Productivity Relative to US
Relative Y Relative Y/H
(1) (2)
Tanzania 0.06 0.07
India 0.12 0.13
United States 0.34 0.35
of credit markets. Na¨ıve persistence is always equal to one in absence of credit mar-
kets as all workers are restricted in their fathers’ occupations. The much higher level
of productivity in US in absence of credit markets implies that the fathers in US are
employed in more productive occupations as compared to other countries.
D.3 Sensitivity to Parameter Values
The value of the elasticity of human capital with respect to education spend-
ing η is taken to be 0.400 based on Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri
(2014). Table D.2 shows the sensitivity of results when alternative values of η are
considered. Output drops less at a higher level of η. With an increase in the elasticty
η, the relative importance of talent in producing human capital decreases and the
effects of misallocation gets somewhat muted. The productivity loss is always within
1% of the loss reported by the benchmark model for both the measures.
Table D.2: Estimates at Different Levels of η
Baseline
η = 0.3 η = 0.4 η = 0.5
φ Y Y/H φ Y Y/H φ Y Y/H
Tanzania 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.33
India 0.26 0.76 0.79 0.26 0.77 0.79 0.26 0.77 0.79
The two estimates of productivity vary over a closer range when larger values
of elasticity is considered. This happens because the relative importance of hours
worked in producing human capital declines with an increase in η. Overall, relative
output and relative output per worker vary over a small range when different values
of η are considered.
The value of elasticity of substitution parameter ρ has been set to 2/3 following
Hsieh et al. (2014). Table D.3 reports the sensitivity of results with respect to ρ. It
becomes easier to substitute among occupational labor inputs with an increase in ρ
which compensates for some of the talent misallocation. This is reflected in higher
relative output obtained when ρ is changed to 4/5. In absence of credit markets
output drops four percentage points more at ρ = 1/2 and one percentage point
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Table D.3: Estimates at Different Levels of ρ
Baseline
ρ = 1/2 ρ = 2/3 ρ = 4/5
φ Y Y/H φ Y Y/H φ Y Y/H
Tanzania 0.13 0.29 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.11 0.33 0.33
India 0.28 0.73 0.80 0.26 0.77 0.79 0.24 0.78 0.79
less at ρ = 4/5 compared to the output produced under perfect credit markets. Both
measures of productivity drop by a factor of 16 in absence of credit markets at ρ = 4/5
compared to 25 times drop seen in the baseline case when all fathers are placed in
agriculture. However, the loss in productivity calculated at considered levels of ρ
do not deviate from each other by more than 5 percentage points. Similar to higher
values of η, higher values of ρ imply higher substitutibility between occupational labor
inputs which limit the relative importance of hours worked in human capital creation
leading to a convergence in the two measures of productivity.
Based on above discussion, I conclude that the baseline results of the model do
not change much to alternative choices of these two parameters.
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Figure E.1: Na¨ıve Persistence Across Data Sources
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Figure E.2: Bias in Na¨ıve Persistence vs. GDP per Capita
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Table E.1: Productivity Relative to US
φ Relative Y Relative Y/H
(1) (2) (3)
Austria 0.37 0.97 0.97
Belgium 1.00 1.00 1.00
Bulgaria 0.32 0.92 0.93
Croatia 0.36 0.96 0.96
Czech Republic 0.38 0.97 0.97
Egypt 0.28 0.83 0.85
Estonia 0.45 0.99 0.99
France 0.42 0.99 0.99
Germany 0.36 0.96 0.96
Greece 0.31 0.91 0.92
Hungary 0.34 0.94 0.95
India 0.25 0.77 0.79
Ireland 0.37 0.96 0.97
Latvia 0.34 0.94 0.95
Lithuania 0.35 0.95 0.96
Netherlands 0.36 0.95 0.96
Norway 0.37 0.97 0.97
Poland 0.36 0.96 0.97
Portugal 0.34 0.94 0.95
Romania 0.36 0.96 0.97
Russia 0.40 0.98 0.98
Slovakia 0.34 0.94 0.95
Slovenia 0.41 0.98 0.98
Sweden 0.36 0.96 0.96
Switzerland 0.39 0.98 0.98
Turkey 0.27 0.82 0.84
Ukraine 0.33 0.93 0.94
United Kingdom 0.42 0.98 0.98
The table reports productivity relative to US when the country-specific distribution of fathers
is used together with a value of φ that pins down the adjusted persistence for the country.
118
Table E.2: Productivity Relative to US: IPUMS-I Sample
φ Relative Y Relative Y/H
(1) (2) (3)
Bolivia 0.27 0.83 0.85
Brazil 0.29 0.87 0.89
Burkina Faso 0.08 0.18 0.19
Cambodia 0.20 0.61 0.63
Cameroon 0.21 0.63 0.65
Costa Rica 0.35 0.95 0.96
Cuba 0.37 0.97 0.97
Ecuador 0.28 0.85 0.87
El Salvador 0.31 0.91 0.92
Ghana 0.26 0.79 0.81
Guinea 0.19 0.56 0.58
Haiti 0.25 0.76 0.78
Indonesia 0.26 0.80 0.81
Iran 0.29 0.87 0.88
Jordan 0.33 0.93 0.94
Kyrgyzstan 0.27 0.82 0.83
Malawi 0.29 0.87 0.88
Malaysia 0.31 0.91 0.92
Mali 0.16 0.47 0.49
Mongolia 0.24 0.74 0.76
Nicaragua 0.28 0.84 0.85
Panama 0.30 0.89 0.90
Peru 0.34 0.94 0.95
Philippines 0.26 0.79 0.81
Senegal 0.26 0.80 0.82
South Africa 0.34 0.94 0.95
Sudan 0.26 0.80 0.82
Tanzania 0.12 0.31 0.32
Thailand 0.27 0.82 0.84
Uganda 0.22 0.68 0.70
Uruguay 0.36 0.96 0.96
Venezuela 0.29 0.87 0.89
Vietnam 0.23 0.66 0.68
The table reports productivity relative to US when the country-specific distribution of fathers
is used together with a value of φ that pins down the adjusted persistence for the country.
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Table E.3: Productivity Relative to US: No Credit Markets
Relative Y Relative Y/H
(1) (2)
Austria 0.29 0.30
Belgium 0.30 0.31
Bulgaria 0.26 0.27
Croatia 0.27 0.28
Czech Republic 0.29 0.30
Egypt 0.19 0.20
Estonia 0.30 0.32
France 0.28 0.29
Germany 0.30 0.32
Greece 0.23 0.24
Hungary 0.29 0.30
India 0.12 0.13
Ireland 0.25 0.27
Latvia 0.29 0.30
Lithuania 0.27 0.28
Netherlands 0.30 0.32
Norway 0.31 0.33
Poland 0.25 0.26
Portugal 0.25 0.26
Romania 0.26 0.27
Russia 0.29 0.30
Slovakia 0.31 0.32
Slovenia 0.29 0.30
Sweden 0.30 0.32
Switzerland 0.29 0.31
Turkey 0.16 0.17
Ukraine 0.30 0.32
United Kingdom 0.32 0.34
United States 0.34 0.36
The table reports productivity relative to US when the country-specific distribution of fathers
is used in absence of credit markets.
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Table E.4: Productivity Relative to US: : No Credit Markets (IPUMS-I Sample)
Relative Y Relative Y/H
(1) (2)
Bolivia 0.19 0.19
Brazil 0.23 0.25
Burkina Faso 0.04 0.04
Cambodia 0.10 0.10
Cameroon 0.09 0.10
Costa Rica 0.22 0.23
Cuba 0.29 0.31
Ecuador 0.19 0.20
Egypt 0.21 0.22
El Salvador 0.22 0.23
Ghana 0.12 0.13
Guinea 0.08 0.08
Haiti 0.09 0.10
Indonesia 0.12 0.13
Iran 0.19 0.20
Jordan 0.29 0.30
Kyrgyzstan 0.16 0.17
Malawi 0.13 0.13
Malaysia 0.26 0.27
Mali 0.08 0.09
Mongolia 0.15 0.16
Nicaragua 0.19 0.20
Panama 0.24 0.25
Peru 0.23 0.24
Philippines 0.17 0.18
Senegal 0.13 0.14
South Africa 0.31 0.32
Sudan 0.16 0.17
Tanzania 0.06 0.06
Thailand 0.19 0.20
Uganda 0.08 0.08
Uruguay 0.26 0.27
Venezuela 0.28 0.29
Vietnam 0.09 0.09
The table reports productivity relative to US when the country-specific distribution of fathers
is used in absence of credit markets.
121
Table E.5: Productivity Gap Explained
Relative Y
000Model000 000Data000 Gap Explained
(1) (2) (3)
Austria 0.97 0.92 38%
Belgium 1.00 0.96 0%
Bulgaria 0.92 0.28 11%
Croatia 0.96 0.40 7%
Czech Republic 0.97 0.57 7%
Egypt 0.83 0.18 21%
Estonia 0.99 0.40 2%
France 0.99 0.83 6%
Germany 0.96 0.81 21%
Greece 0.91 0.69 29%
Hungary 0.94 0.47 11%
India 0.77 0.11 26%
Ireland 0.96 0.88 33%
Latvia 0.94 0.29 8%
Lithuania 0.95 0.35 8%
Netherlands 0.95 0.88 42%
Norway 0.97 1.15 -20%
Poland 0.96 0.44 7%
Portugal 0.94 0.46 11%
Romania 0.96 0.24 5%
Russia 0.98 0.34 3%
Slovakia 0.94 0.47 11%
Slovenia 0.98 0.60 5%
Sweden 0.96 0.83 24%
Switzerland 0.98 0.79 10%
Turkey 0.82 0.41 31%
Ukraine 0.93 0.17 8%
United Kingdom 0.98 0.81 11%
Column 1 shows output per worker relative to US as predicted by the model. Column 2 reports
output per worker relative to US (Source: Penn World Tables).
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Table E.6: Productivity Gap Explained: IPUMS-I Sample
Relative Y
000Model000 000Data000 Gap Explained
(1) (2) (3)
Bolivia 0.83 0.10 19%
Brazil 0.87 0.19 16%
Burkina Faso 0.18 0.02 84%
Cambodia 0.61 0.04 41%
Cameroon 0.79 0.05 22%
Costa Rica 0.95 0.30 7%
Cuba 0.30 0.97 4%
Ecuador 0.85 0.16 18%
El Salvador 0.91 0.18 11%
Ghana 0.79 0.06 22%
Guinea 0.56 0.02 45%
Haiti 0.76 0.04 25%
Indonesia 0.10 0.80 22%
Iran 0.87 0.34 20%
Jordan 0.93 0.21 9%
Kyrgyzstan 0.82 0.05 19%
Malawi 0.87 0.02 13%
Malaysia 0.91 0.34 14%
Mali 0.47 0.04 55%
Mongolia 0.74 0.10 29%
Nicaragua 0.84 0.07 17%
Panama 0.89 0.28 15%
Peru 0.94 0.17 7%
Philippines 0.79 0.09 23%
Senegal 0.80 0.04 21%
South Africa 0.94 0.25 8%
Sudan 0.80 0.09 22%
Tanzania 0.32 0.03 70%
Thailand 0.82 0.17 22%
Uganda 0.68 0.03 33%
Uruguay 0.96 0.28 6%
Venezuela 0.87 0.24 17%
Vietnam 0.66 0.06 36%
Column 1 shows output per worker relative to US as predicted by the model. Column 2 reports
output per worker relative to US (Source: Penn World Tables).
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APPENDIX F
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Table F.1: Intergenerational Occupational Elasticity
Country Absolute Scale Adjusted Scale
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
Austria 0.234∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
Belgium 0.392∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.373∗
Bolivia 0.306∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
Bulgaria 0.430∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
Cambodia 0.429∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
Cameroon 0.240∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
Costa Rica 0.216∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
Croatia 0.229∗∗ 0.216∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.099
Cuba 0.203∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
Czech Republic 0.286∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
Ecuador 0.312∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
Egypt 0.371∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
Estonia 0.336∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
France 0.248∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
Germany 0.318∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
Ghana 0.205∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
Greece 0.338∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
Guinea 0.281∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
Hungary 0.301∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
India 0.357∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
Iran 0.226∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
Ireland 0.224∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
Jordan 0.437∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
Latvia 0.234∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
Lithuania 0.323∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. ∗∗Significant at 5%. ∗Significant at 10%.
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Intergenerational Occupational Elasticity (contd.)
Country Absolute Scale Adjusted Scale
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
Malaysia 0.212∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
Mali 0.348∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
Mongolia 0.261∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
Netherlands 0.343∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
Nicaragua 0.283∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
Panama 0.243∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
Philippines 0.430∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
Poland 0.249∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
Romania 0.439∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
Russia 0.223∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
Senegal 0.238∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
Slovakia 0.195∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
Slovenia 0.280∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
South Africa 0.339∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
Sudan 0.429∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
Switzerland 0.290∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
Thailand 0.387∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
Turkey 0.179∗∗ 0.201 0.204∗∗ 0.213
Uganda 0.275∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
Ukraine 0.289∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗
United Kingdom 0.354∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
United States 0.189∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
Uruguay 0.225∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
Venezuela 0.312∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
Vietnam 0.391∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. ∗∗Significant at 5%. ∗Significant at 10%.
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Table F.2: Propensity to Move Relative to Father’s Position
Country Sons Daughters
Upwards Downwards Upwards Downwards
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria 54.59 40.56 43.34 55.29
Belgium 46.84 49.50 36.61 60.71
Bolivia 43.52 31.90 51.01 40.82
Bulgaria 47.14 45.14 48.41 50.40
Cambodia 24.70 25.73 25.85 28.83
Cameroon 31.54 36.76 33.09 45.13
Costa Rica 35.45 43.07 49.96 45.35
Croatia 45.36 48.63 46.21 51.52
Cuba 39.65 40.07 59.34 35.76
Czech Republic 46.03 45.26 44.76 53.02
Ecuador 35.80 26.00 50.47 33.29
Egypt 35.52 27.29 56.47 33.68
Estonia 57.83 37.75 62.67 34.93
France 39.01 46.40 43.79 51.21
Germany 50.46 42.88 46.20 50.76
Ghana 37.05 41.78 23.70 64.89
Greece 39.78 35.86 53.82 38.23
Guinea 28.14 23.46 35.46 43.26
Hungary 46.79 47.55 48.75 50.53
India 26.13 52.16 22.25 54.68
Iran 36.19 27.60 66.20 19.25
Ireland 42.30 50.98 53.50 45.50
Jordan 49.03 28.54 65.87 24.25
Latvia 55.02 38.41 57.10 41.39
Lithuania 52.38 42.86 59.60 39.07
†The table reports the fraction of sons and daughters that moved up (columns 1 and 3) or down
(columns 2 and 4) relative to their fathers’ occupational score. All figures in percentages.
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Propensity to Move Relative to Father’s Position (contd.)
Country Sons Daughters
Upwards Downwards Upwards Downwards
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Malaysia 36.50 33.62 48.98 37.92
Mali 4.25 5.08 5.27 11.16
Mongolia 34.64 50.36 45.10 48.69
Netherlands 50.30 43.41 55.31 40.71
Nicaragua 27.62 29.62 44.47 48.57
Panama 34.14 29.19 49.29 44.16
Philippines 33.53 26.71 46.93 39.32
Poland 48.54 40.13 44.44 45.99
Romania 31.70 32.51 47.16 33.27
Russia 50.12 39.40 60.69 36.69
Senegal 20.37 26.08 19.01 46.00
Slovakia 46.22 49.00 50.19 47.86
Slovenia 57.02 36.40 56.15 38.93
South Africa 42.89 35.03 44.95 43.71
Sudan 22.65 26.42 35.93 21.32
Switzerland 42.22 42.50 50.23 46.33
Thailand 25.45 28.38 32.28 30.46
Turkey 41.82 43.27 40.00 60.00
Uganda 33.41 37.64 34.26 42.23
Ukraine 50.48 43.81 56.46 42.11
United Kingdom 46.59 49.86 41.44 57.21
United States 40.08 50.28 51.67 43.89
Uruguay 35.39 45.37 42.23 51.57
Venezuela 32.18 27.37 54.68 36.17
Vietnam 22.35 13.51 25.87 16.69
†The table reports the fraction of sons and daughters that moved up (columns 1 and 3) or down
(columns 2 and 4) relative to their fathers’ occupational score. All figures in percentages.
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Table F.3: Transition Probabilities
Country Sons Daughters
Bottom to Top Top to Bottom Bottom to Top Top to Bottom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria 3.06 3.83 3.75 1.02
Belgium 3.99 2.99 5.36 4.46
Bolivia 6.29 3.90 6.38 4.56
Bulgaria 3.43 4.00 3.57 3.17
Cambodia 3.24 4.09 2.95 3.62
Cameroon 5.22 3.76 4.93 4.33
Costa Rica 6.74 4.16 7.07 3.46
Croatia 3.83 5.46 4.55 3.03
Cuba 5.84 5.20 5.47 5.00
Czech Republic 3.29 3.48 5.85 3.63
Ecuador 5.85 3.10 5.01 7.97
Egypt 5.32 5.20 2.32 5.82
Estonia 2.41 4.02 7.88 3.08
France 3.85 4.24 3.27 4.67
Germany 4.44 3.70 5.86 0.87
Ghana 4.62 4.91 7.44 9.58
Greece 5.39 2.85 4.65 2.73
Guinea 5.22 4.31 8.51 6.38
Hungary 4.15 5.66 7.12 3.91
India 5.96 14.76 17.83 14.59
Iran 6.29 5.99 8.68 4.06
Ireland 6.16 2.52 2.75 4.00
Jordan 2.53 2.02 6.29 2.54
Latvia 3.81 3.11 3.93 3.02
Lithuania 2.04 5.44 3.31 5.30
†Columns (1) and (3) report the fraction of sons and daughters from lowest quartile fathers that
moved to the top quartile in their generation, while columns (2) and (4) report the fraction of
sons and daughters from the highest quartile fathers that moved to the bottom quartile in their
generation. All figures in percentages.
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Transition Probabilities (contd.)
Country Sons Daughters
Bottom to Top Top to Bottom Bottom to Top Top to Bottom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Malaysia 6.90 11.52 5.66 9.01
Mali 2.58 3.77 3.20 8.16
Mongolia 2.86 6.43 3.27 2.61
Netherlands 4.49 2.99 4.20 4.42
Nicaragua 7.03 5.18 6.02 5.89
Panama 6.27 5.46 6.62 5.98
Philippines 4.64 2.75 5.64 3.25
Poland 5.83 4.53 4.32 5.25
Romania 4.49 7.24 2.58 6.79
Russia 5.74 3.99 4.44 4.23
Senegal 4.08 16.74 7.10 28.89
Slovakia 3.59 3.59 5.06 1.17
Slovenia 4.39 4.82 5.74 1.64
South Africa 2.65 3.93 4.19 5.91
Sudan 1.73 1.49 1.77 0.84
Switzerland 5.44 3.53 3.44 2.98
Thailand 5.60 3.75 5.77 9.63
Turkey 6.91 18.18 6.25 18.72
Uganda 2.00 4.68 2.39 4.38
Ukraine 7.62 4.76 11.00 0.96
United Kingdom 5.45 3.00 4.95 6.53
United States 5.20 5.95 5.22 5.47
Uruguay 4.92 10.60 5.26 7.85
Venezuela 6.50 2.81 8.50 2.73
Vietnam 12.63 5.29 6.73 5.31
†Columns (1) and (3) report the fraction of sons and daughters from lowest quartile fathers that
moved to the top quartile in their generation, while columns (2) and (4) report the fraction of
sons and daughters from the highest quartile fathers that moved to the bottom quartile in their
generation. All figures in percentages.
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Figure G.1: Average Gain in Occupational Prestige (Absolute Scale)
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(b) Daughters
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Figure G.2: Average Loss in Occupational Prestige (Absolute Scale)
(a) Sons
BOL CHE
CRI
CUB
CZE
ECU
EGY
EST
FRA
GBR
GER
GHA
GIN
I LKHM
LVA
MNG
MYS
NIC
PHL
POLROU
RUS
SEN
SVN
TUR
UGA
UKR
USA
VEN
VNM
URY
ZAF
JOR
IRN
PAN
THA
GRC
SDN
CMR
BGR
BEL
HRVHUNNLD
SVK
LTU
AUT
MLI
IND
10
15
20
25
30
Av
er
ag
e 
lo
ss
0 10 20 30 40 50
Proportion moving down relative to fathers (%)
Correlation = 0.3875***
(b) Daughters
BOL CHE
CRI
CUB
CZE
ECU
EGYEST
FRA
GBR
GER
GHA
GIN
IRL
KHM
LVA
MNG
MYS
NIC
PHL
POL
ROU
RUS SEN
SVN
TUR
UGA
UKR
USA
VEN
VNM
URY
ZAF
JOR
IRN
PAN
THA
GRC
SDN
CMR
BGR
BEL
HRV
HUN
NLD
SVK
LTU
AUT
MLI
IND
5
10
15
20
25
Av
er
ag
e 
lo
ss
 
0 20 40 60
Proportion moving down relative to fathers (%)
Correlation = 0.4479***
137
APPENDIX H
CHAPTER 3: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
138
Proposition 1: Let w¯jg =
wjφˆ
φj
j (1− φˆj)ηη(1− η)1−η
(1 + τ ejg)
η/(1− τwjg)
where φˆj =
φj
1 + φj
. Then,
using equation 3.11 consumption conditional on choosing occupation j can be writ-
ten as c∗jg(|j) = (w¯jgj)
1
1−η . A worker from group g chooses an occupation j if
her consumption from choosing occupation j is largest over all possible occupations.
Hence,
pjg = Prob(c
∗
jg(|j) > c∗sg(|s) ∀s 6= j
= Prob(w¯jgj > w¯sgs) ∀s 6= j
=
∫ ∞
0
[ ∫ α1gj
0
. . .
∫ αJgj
0
θT1ge
−T1g−θ1 . . . θTJge−TJg
−θ
J d1 . . . dJ
]
θTjge
−Tjg−θ1 dj
(where αsg = w¯jg/w¯sg)
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
s 6=j
e−Tsgα
−θ
sg 
−θ
j θTjge
−Tjg−θ1 dj
=
∫ ∞
0
∑
s 6=j
Tsgα
−θ
sg∑
s 6=j
Tsgα−θsg
θTjge
−
J∑
s=1
(Tsgα
−θ
sg )
−θ
j
dj
=
Tjg
J∑
s=1
Tsgα−θsg
∫ ∞
0
θ
∑
s 6=j
Tsgα
−θ
sg e
−
J∑
s=1
(Tsgα
−θ
sg )
−θ
j
dj
=
Tjg
J∑
s=1
Tsgα−θsg
=
w¯θjgTjg
J∑
s=1
w¯θsgTsg

Proposition 2: First, I find the expected talent of a worker from group g
given that she has chosen occupation j, i.e., E(∗jg|Worker chooses j). Let w¯∗∗ ≡
maxs{w¯sgs}. Then,
G(x) = Prob(∗ < x) = Prob(w¯sgs < w¯∗x) ∀s
= Prob
(
s <
w¯∗x
w¯sg
)
=
J∏
s=1
e[−Tsg(w¯sg/w¯
∗)θx−θ]
= e−[
∑
(Tsg(w¯sg/w¯∗)θ)x−θ]
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The above result shows that the expected talent of a worker from group g also follows
Fre´chet with the same shape parameter θ and an adjusted mean parameter given by∑
(Tsg(w¯sg/w¯
∗)θ).
Define T ∗ =
∑
(Tsg(w¯sg/w¯
∗)θ) and let λ be any positive number. Then,
E(λj ) =
∞∫
0
λdG()
=
∞∫
0
θT ∗−(θ+1−λ)e−T
∗−θd
= T ∗λ/θ
∞∫
0
y−
λ
θ e−xdy
(where y = T ∗−θ)
= T ∗λ/θΓ
(
1− λ
θ
)
where Γ(.) is the gamma function. Using the above result and the expression of pjg
from proposition 1, I get
E
(

1
1−η
j
∣∣∣∣Worker chooses j) = T ∗1/θ(1−η)Γ(1− 1θ(1− η)
)
=
(
Tjg
pjg
) 1
θ(1−η)
Γ
(
1− 1
θ(1− η)
)
(H.1)
Next, I find the expression for the expected efficiency labor provided by any group g
in any occupation j which is given by
E
(
e∗ηjgjs
∗φj
j (1− s∗j)
)
= γ
[
ηηs
∗φj
j (1− s∗j)
(
wj(1− τwjg)
1 + τ ejg
)η] 1
1−η
(
Tjg
pjg
) 1
θ(1−η)
(H.2)
Now, the expected wage income of workers in group g working in an occupation j
can be written as
incjg = (1− τwjg)wjE
(
e∗ηjgjs
∗φj
j (1− s∗j)
)
⇒ incjg
incj,hm
=
[ ∑J
s=0 w¯
θ
sgTsg∑J
s=0 w¯
θ
s,hmTs,hm
] 1
θ(1−η)
Hence, the wage gap across any two groups is same across all occupations and are
independent of the occupation-specific frictions τwjg and τ
e
jg. 
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Table I.1: Estimated Gross Frictions: High-caste Women
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Engineers 3.12 1.76 1.39 2.87 1.65 1.30
Engineering technicians 70.58 1.99 1.94 65.17 1.85 1.84
Aircraft and ship officers 3.21 49.85 - 3.04 46.46 -
Life scientists 1.45 1.73 - 1.43 1.64 -
Life science technicians - 1.09 2.12 - 1.03 2.00
Physicians and surgeons 0.89 1.03 1.00 0.89 1.02 1.00
Medical Technicians 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.79 0.80
Technicians NEC 2.20 1.09 - 2.11 1.09 -
Mathematicians 3.72 1.20 1.73 3.52 1.17 1.64
Social Scientists 1.20 1.60 1.58 1.16 1.54 1.55
Law professionals 1.37 1.27 2.41 1.32 1.22 2.30
Teachers 0.87 0.95 1.03 0.90 0.98 1.06
Authors, artists and atheletes 1.12 1.30 1.04 1.08 1.25 0.99
Professionals NEC 1.07 1.03 1.28 1.08 1.05 1.25
Administrative, executive and managerial 28.56 1.58 1.57 26.74 1.51 1.51
Clerical supervisors 1.40 1.28 1.27 1.34 1.25 1.24
Typists 1.07 0.89 0.97 1.07 0.92 0.97
Bookkeepers 1.41 1.16 1.18 1.36 1.13 1.16
Clerks NEC 1.16 1.07 1.11 1.14 1.05 1.10
Customer service clerks 25.94 1.52 1.48 24.97 1.48 1.45
Transport supervisors 165.41 2.03 1.59 156.96 1.92 1.54
Transport conductors and guards 5.77 5.39 1.95 5.21 4.70 1.73
Mail distributors 2.36 2.05 1.43 2.15 1.90 1.33
Telephone and telegraph operators 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00
Merchants and sales technicians 98.92 1.99 2.15 95.2 1.92 1.99
Salesmen and sales agents 1.97 1.93 1.90 1.86 1.81 1.77
Hotel and house keepers 1.09 2.11 1.50 1.11 2.11 1.51
Cooks and waiters 1.53 1.85 1.79 1.52 1.83 1.80
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by high-caste women over time. The first
three column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case
when θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014). (contd.)
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Estimated Gross Frictions: High-caste Women
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Housekeeping services and building care 0.8 0.89 0.84 0.87 0.96 0.93
Launderers 1.58 2.25 2.16 1.62 2.33 2.22
Hairdressers and barbers 1.57 0.8 1.09 1.53 0.78 1.08
Protective service workers 2.59 1.97 1.93 2.32 1.81 1.77
Service workers NEC 1.35 1.85 1.88 1.33 1.85 1.89
Farm managers and supervisors - 3.33 4.19 - 3.11 4.01
Cultivators 0.27 1.72 1.78 0.27 1.73 1.78
Animal and Vegetable Growers 473.89 1.44 2.44 479.62 1.47 2.45
Agricultural labourers 0.34 1.21 1.19 0.35 1.24 1.23
Plantation labourers 1.1 1.07 1.09 1.14 1.09 1.11
Farm workers NEC 1.78 1.61 2.05 1.69 1.56 1.98
Loggers 2.17 2.51 1.59 2.11 2.46 1.58
Hunters and trappers - - 5.7 - - 5.59
Fishermen 3.82 1.8 0.86 3.56 1.72 0.8
Agricultural workers NEC - 1.76 - - 1.69 -
Miners and quarrymen 0 2.56 4.86 0 2.46 4.58
Metal processors 8.1 2.32 4.92 7.15 2.12 4.34
Wood and paper workers 2.63 2.36 1.36 2.45 2.26 1.32
Chemical processors 2.85 2.08 2.19 2.7 1.96 2.11
Spinners and weavers 52.15 1.94 2.05 51.27 1.93 2.04
Fellmongers and pelt dressers - 2.21 2.09 - 2.28 2.04
Food and beverage processors 1.71 2.23 1.55 1.69 2.22 1.55
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by high-caste women over time. The first
three column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case
when θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014). (contd.)
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Estimated Gross Frictions: High-caste Women
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Tobacco preparers 0.86 0.86 1.13 0.92 0.93 1.21
Tailors and dressmakers 1.43 1.34 1.5 1.42 1.34 1.5
Leather workers 3.01 1.90 2.83 2.83 1.83 2.74
Carpenters and cabinet makers 2.25 2.41 2.37 2.03 2.16 2.06
Stone cutters and carvers 1.39 1.72 1.67 1.39 1.71 1.65
Blacksmiths and toolmakers 2.35 3.05 3.77 2.15 2.77 3.53
Machinery fitters and assemblers 95.45 3.07 2.76 83.62 2.77 2.46
Electrical fitters 1.98 1.95 2.69 1.79 1.78 2.45
Communications equipment operators - - 0.64 - - 0.61
Plumbers and welders 2.10 3.51 9.84 1.84 3.11 8.58
Precious metal workers 5.01 2.76 2.94 4.53 2.59 2.70
Glass formers and potters 1.27 2.57 2.32 1.28 2.55 2.28
Rubber and plastics product makers 1.29 2.73 4.20 1.24 2.65 4.00
Paper and paper product makers 2.48 4.42 3.44 2.45 4.25 3.33
Printers 2.15 2.27 2.76 2.07 2.18 2.64
Painters 1.55 1.78 4.36 1.44 1.65 4
Production workers NEC 2.13 3.49 2.34 2.12 3.53 2.34
Construction workers 1.88 2.04 1.82 1.86 2.00 1.78
Stationary engine operators - 4.27 1.35 - 3.87 1.27
Material handling equipment operators 1.83 2.02 2.23 1.78 1.94 2.13
Transport equipment operators 3.90 2.92 3.53 3.44 2.53 3.07
Laborers NEC 1.82 1.73 1.65 1.81 1.71 1.62
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by high-caste women over time. The first
three column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case
when θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014).
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Table I.2: Estimated Gross Frictions: Low-caste Men
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Engineers 1.96 1.75 1.51 1.84 1.65 1.47
Engineering technicians 57.26 1.62 1.41 54.00 1.55 1.37
Aircraft and ship officers 1.61 5.90 - 1.54 5.41 -
Life scientists 2.02 1.16 - 1.93 1.14 -
Life science technicians - 0.96 1.26 - 0.94 1.21
Physicians and surgeons 1.91 1.78 1.15 1.83 1.70 1.13
Medical Technicians 1.19 1.08 1.00 1.17 1.06 1.00
Technicians NEC 1.98 - - 1.91 - -
Mathematicians 1.11 1.68 1.21 1.09 1.60 1.17
Social Scientists 1.70 1.68 1.28 1.62 1.60 1.25
Law professionals 0.76 1.73 1.31 0.69 1.65 1.26
Teachers 1.44 1.27 1.03 1.40 1.24 1.03
Authors, artists and atheletes 1.18 1.82 0.98 1.15 1.77 0.96
Professionals NEC 2.11 1.99 1.03 2.11 1.95 1.00
Administrative, executive and managerial 35.12 1.59 1.50 33.27 1.52 1.45
Clerical supervisors 1.49 1.32 1.13 1.45 1.29 1.12
Typists 1.76 1.38 1.23 1.65 1.32 1.20
Bookkeepers 1.62 1.28 1.16 1.53 1.22 1.11
Clerks NEC 1.47 1.27 1.08 1.40 1.23 1.06
Customer service clerks 21.61 1.13 0.98 21.42 1.12 0.99
Transport supervisors 123.42 1.29 1.26 116.73 1.25 1.22
Transport conductors and guards 1.17 1.18 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.12
Mail distributors 1.35 1.12 1.13 1.34 1.11 1.12
Telephone and telegraph operators 1.52 1.19 0.99 1.48 1.16 0.99
Merchants and sales technicians 46.33 1.58 1.76 43.57 1.55 1.68
Salesmen and sales agents 1.63 1.77 1.56 1.55 1.68 1.49
Hotel and house keepers 0.93 0.79 1.71 0.91 0.78 1.67
Cooks and waiters 1.27 1.27 1.32 1.22 1.23 1.28
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by low-caste men over time. The first three
column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case when
θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014). (contd.)
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Estimated Gross Frictions: Low-caste Men
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Housekeeping services and building care 0.72 0.61 0.61 0.75 0.64 0.63
Launderers 1.01 1.24 0.92 1.03 1.24 0.92
Hairdressers and barbers 1.63 0.8 0.93 1.56 0.78 0.89
Protective service workers 1.11 1.13 1.03 1.10 1.12 1.03
Service workers NEC 1.03 1.04 1.44 1.02 1.04 1.42
Farm managers and supervisors - 1.49 0.81 - 1.45 0.80
Cultivators 0.53 0.85 0.94 0.55 0.87 0.95
Animal and Vegetable Growers 306.39 1.37 1.30 307.73 1.38 1.29
Agricultural labourers 19.54 0.82 0.88 20.13 0.85 0.90
Plantation labourers 1.32 1.10 0.94 1.32 1.10 0.94
Farm workers NEC 0.81 1.21 0.98 0.82 1.21 0.98
Loggers 0.95 0.83 1.04 0.97 0.86 1.06
Hunters and trappers - 1.21 2.10 - 1.21 2.07
Fishermen 1.00 1.24 1.05 1.00 1.23 1.04
Agricultural workers NEC 1.08 2.99 - 1.07 2.84 -
Miners and quarrymen 0.83 0.89 1.30 0.85 0.90 1.31
Metal processors 1.65 1.27 1.26 1.61 1.24 1.23
Wood and paper workers 0.74 1.34 1.52 0.73 1.31 1.49
Chemical processors 2.10 1.49 1.54 2.02 1.46 1.50
Spinners and weavers 30.43 1.22 1.25 29.84 1.19 1.23
Fellmongers and pelt dressers - 1.71 0.89 - 1.77 0.91
Food and beverage processors 1.42 1.22 1.36 1.38 1.19 1.33
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by low-caste men over time. The first three
column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case when
θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014). (contd.)
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Estimated Gross Frictions: Low-caste Men
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Tobacco preparers 1.24 1.32 1.79 1.23 1.29 1.79
Tailors and dressmakers 1.48 1.29 1.37 1.43 1.25 1.33
Leather workers 0.97 1.36 0.86 1.00 1.37 0.88
Carpenters and cabinet makers 1.29 1.17 0.96 1.26 1.15 0.95
Stone cutters and carvers 0.88 1.13 1.03 0.90 1.14 1.04
Blacksmiths and toolmakers 1.55 1.33 1.40 1.50 1.28 1.37
Machinery fitters and assemblers 36.22 1.27 1.26 35.11 1.24 1.23
Electrical fitters 1.38 1.31 1.16 1.34 1.29 1.15
Communications equipment operators 1.55 0.91 0.50 1.51 0.88 0.49
Plumbers and welders 1.08 1.33 1.16 1.06 1.29 1.14
Precious metal workers 1.64 1.44 1.99 1.56 1.37 1.86
Glass formers and potters 0.94 1.17 1.23 0.95 1.18 1.24
Rubber and plastics product makers 1.43 1.65 1.92 1.41 1.64 1.87
Paper and paper product makers 1.28 1.45 0.97 1.27 1.34 0.95
Printers 1.37 2.25 1.21 1.31 2.15 1.18
Painters 1.06 0.92 1.05 1.06 0.91 1.04
Production workers NEC 1.09 1.5 1.34 1.09 1.49 1.32
Construction workers 0.99 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.04 1.04
Stationary engine operators - 1.13 1.05 - 1.12 1.04
Material handling equipment operators 1.14 1.17 1.12 1.15 1.16 1.11
Transport equipment operators 1.22 1.19 1.08 1.20 1.17 1.06
Laborers NEC 0.03 0.96 0.95 0.03 0.98 0.96
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by low-caste men over time. The first three
column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case when
θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014).
147
Table I.3: Estimated Gross Frictions: Low-caste Women
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Engineers - 3.23 2.66 - 2.81 2.41
Engineering technicians 111.79 2.17 2.75 98.55 1.99 2.53
Aircraft and ship officers - - - - - -
Life scientists - - - - - -
Life science technicians - - - - - -
Physicians and surgeons 1.81 1.55 1.45 1.67 1.44 1.39
Medical Technicians 0.99 0.90 0.79 1.00 0.91 0.81
Technicians NEC - - - - - -
Mathematicians 1.83 - 1.00 1.83 - 0.94
Social Scientists 2.58 2.29 2.85 2.41 2.13 2.78
Law professionals - - - - - -
Teachers 1.45 1.46 1.23 1.42 1.43 1.24
Authors, artists and atheletes - 7.34 2.39 - 6.55 2.18
Professionals NEC 2.20 - - 2.21 - -
Administrative, executive and managerial 76.24 6.71 2.98 69.83 6.04 2.76
Clerical supervisors 1.74 1.56 1.35 1.64 1.48 1.30
Typists 1.60 1.44 1.06 1.53 1.39 1.06
Bookkeepers 2.30 2.35 2.37 2.07 2.15 2.20
Clerks NEC 1.65 1.37 1.24 1.54 1.30 1.20
Customer service clerks 35.7 1.71 1.36 33.31 1.64 1.33
Transport supervisors 433.94 2.33 3.13 393.13 2.08 2.88
Transport conductors and guards - - 4.75 - - 4.16
Mail distributors - - 1.22 - - 1.14
Telephone and telegraph operators - 1.23 1.48 - 1.15 1.36
Merchants and sales technicians 103.13 1.65 6.20 99.39 1.61 5.79
Salesmen and sales agents 3.48 2.45 2.97 3.16 2.23 2.66
Hotel and house keepers 1.26 1.64 1.41 1.27 1.63 1.38
Cooks and waiters 2.20 2.18 2.23 2.11 2.12 2.19
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by low-caste women over time. The first three
column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case when
θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014). (contd.)
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Estimated Gross Frictions: Low-caste Women
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Housekeeping services and building care 0.70 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.86
Launderers 0.84 1.37 1.14 0.87 1.38 1.16
Hairdressers and barbers - 36.51 0.81 - 33.68 0.78
Protective service workers 2.60 2.38 2.04 2.35 2.13 1.88
Service workers NEC 4.00 2.04 4.63 3.68 2.00 4.39
Farm managers and supervisors - - 1.12 - - 1.05
Cultivators 92.91 1.06 1.38 97.35 1.08 1.39
Animal and Vegetable Growers 256.54 1.72 1.56 259.6 1.75 1.61
Agricultural labourers 19.22 1.00 1.07 20.00 1.05 1.11
Plantation labourers 1.15 1.17 1.08 1.18 1.18 1.10
Farm workers NEC 2.46 1.71 1.87 2.37 1.71 1.82
Loggers 1.45 1.84 1.28 1.42 1.82 1.26
Hunters and trappers - - - - - -
Fishermen 1.63 2.30 4.14 1.54 2.23 3.89
Agricultural workers NEC 2.08 4.02 - 2.09 3.84 -
Miners and quarrymen 0.00 1.96 3.43 0.00 1.94 3.38
Metal processors 1.87 - 3.26 1.72 - 3.06
Wood and paper workers 3.93 5.08 2.79 3.63 4.58 2.65
Chemical processors - - 2.10 - - 2.04
Spinners and weavers 70.10 2.78 1.68 65.79 2.65 1.61
Fellmongers and pelt dressers - 2.64 - - 2.70 -
Food and beverage processors 2.37 2.26 2.31 2.29 2.17 2.25
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by low-caste women over time. The first three
column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case when
θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014). (contd.)
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Estimated Gross Frictions: Low-caste Women
θ(1− η) = 2.96 θ(1− η) = 3.44
1983 1993 2004 1983 1993 2004
Tobacco preparers 1.18 1.32 1.41 1.22 1.36 1.50
Tailors and dressmakers 2.78 2.10 2.49 2.61 1.98 2.38
Leather workers 2.90 4.57 1.63 2.77 4.26 1.65
Carpenters and cabinet makers - 3.45 2.98 - 3.00 2.56
Stone cutters and carvers 1.09 1.87 1.94 1.13 1.85 1.93
Blacksmiths and toolmakers - 2.13 8.44 - 1.84 7.53
Machinery fitters and assemblers - - 6.09 - - 5.40
Electrical fitters 2.85 8.87 11.55 2.51 7.49 9.95
Communications equipment operators 0.67 - - 0.67 - -
Plumbers and welders 4.37 - - 3.90 - -
Precious metal workers - 4.00 2.07 - 3.52 1.86
Glass formers and potters 1.54 2.68 1.61 1.55 2.66 1.62
Rubber and plastics product makers 1.42 1.70 2.84 1.37 1.64 2.75
Paper and paper product makers - 3.05 6.92 - 2.91 6.64
Printers 4.10 1.92 1.90 3.70 1.79 1.78
Painters - 1.61 8.92 - 1.49 7.99
Production workers NEC 1.84 2.52 2.52 1.82 2.57 2.49
Construction workers 1.78 1.78 1.68 1.78 1.77 1.66
Stationary engine operators - 3.41 1.96 - 3.10 1.75
Material handling equipment operators 1.84 2.17 2.22 1.73 2.07 2.09
Transport equipment operators 6.22 7.97 3.06 5.21 6.87 2.65
Laborers NEC 1.63 1.53 1.61 1.64 1.53 1.59
The table reports the gross level of frictions faced by low-caste women over time. The first three
column gives the baseline estimates while the next three columns correspond to the case when
θ(1− η) is fixed at that considered in Hsieh et al. (2014).
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APPENDIX J
CHAPTER 3: LIST OF BRAWNY OCCUPATIONS
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